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Summary 
This work sets out to explore a new contribution to alleviate the distortive impact that inherent 
intellectual shortcomings may have on intelligence analysis. This is highly relevant in efforts to 
improve intelligence, as failures in analysis are closely linked to intelligence failures. Previous work to 
address this issue has covered a wide range of approaches, to include the development of the use of 
alternative competing hypotheses. Business management has established that that the use of teams is 
suitable to improve performance at critical delivery points, but a more in-depth discussion on the team 
factor in intelligence analysis seems not to have been carried out. Thus an exploration of this factor is 
well worth trying.  
The work used both a theoretical and an empirical perspective in exploring the relevance of the 
use of teams in analysis. The aim of the work was see if adequate substantiation could be made in 
order to claim that the use of teams in intelligence analysis could improve the quality of analysis, i.e. 
enabling the production of predictions which are more accurate than they would be without the use of 
teams. The theoretical perspective drew on literature from both management and intelligence. The 
primary data was collected by conducting individual interviews with personnel from the tactical level 
of an intelligence organisation in the Norwegian Armed Forces who were either all-source intelligence 
analysts or were working in positions closely associated with such analysis in the same intelligence 
unit. Following analysis it was determined that the use of teams in intelligence analysis could improve 
the quality of analysis, and herein lies the main contribution of this work. As this conclusion is 
primarily valid for intelligence analysis at the tactical level, further study on the use of teams at the 
strategic level of intelligence is recommended.  
 
 
           
 3 
 
 
            
          
 
 
Acknowledgements  
First and foremost I want to express my sincere appreciation to my master’s thesis advisor, Professor 
Raino Malnes of the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo, for his pertinent and 
elegant guidance during my work on this thesis. His advice served not only to improve my learning 
experience but also enhanced the quality of the work.  
I also want to thank the interviewees for allowing me some insight into their work, without 
them this thesis would have looked quite different. The subject director of the recently introduced 
intelligence studies at the Norwegian Defence University College, senior advisor Kjetil Hatlebrekke, 
also deserves recognition for the inspiring and challenging program he put together and which served 
as an inspiration for the choice of this topic. I must also express my gratitude to Hege Undem Store 
and Nina Eskild Riege, the excellent librarians at the Norwegian Defence University College, for their 
truly valuable assistance. Finally, I want to thank my family and friends for the support I have received 
from them during the work on this thesis, in particular for their patience when at times I was just a 
little bit frazzled.     
 
Oslo, May 2009 
 
Lise Charlotte E. Ingalls 
            
4  
 
 
           
           
 
 
Table of Contents  
Summary .................................................................................................................................................2 
Acknowledgements ...............................................................................................................................3 
Chapter 1 Introduction...........................................................................................................................5 
1.1 BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................................5 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION AND BRIEF OUTLINE ........................................................................................6 
1.2 BRIEFLY ON INTELLIGENCE ...............................................................................................................7 
1.3 THE ESSENCE OF INTELLIGENCE - AN ADVISORY ROLE........................................................................7 
1.2 STRATEGIC VERSUS TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE ....................................................................................8 
1.5 INTELLIGENCE FAILURE ....................................................................................................................9 
1.6 CAUSES OF FAILURE AND THE ROLE OF ANALYSIS ............................................................................10 
Chapter 2 Methodological challenges ...............................................................................................11 
2.1 EXPLORATORY RESEARCH .............................................................................................................11 
2.2 A TWO-TIERED APPROACH..............................................................................................................11 
2.3 WRITTEN VERSUS VERBAL METHOD OF COLLECTION OF DATA...........................................................11 
2.4 SELECTION OF INTERVIEWEES AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS .........................................................12 
2.5 SELECTION OF TYPE OF INTERVIEW.................................................................................................13 
2.6 THE NUMBER OF INTERVIEWEES .....................................................................................................14 
2.7 STRUCTURE OF INTERVIEWS ..........................................................................................................14 
2.8 WORKING WITH THE INTERVIEW GUIDE ............................................................................................15 
2.9 RECORDING THE DATA ...................................................................................................................16 
2.10 EFFECT OF INTERVIEWER AND INTERVIEWEES ...............................................................................17 
2.11 SUMMING UP THE METHOD OF COLLECTING DATA ..........................................................................18 
2.12 POST-INTERVIEW REFLECTIONS....................................................................................................18 
2.13 ANALYSING THE COLLECTED DATA ................................................................................................19 
2.14 VALIDITY .....................................................................................................................................19 
Chapter 3 What can be learned from the use of teams in business management? .....................22 
3.1 INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND INTELLECTUAL BREAKDOWN................................................................22 
3.2 HAS THE USE OF TEAMS BEEN CONSIDERED A REMEDY? ..................................................................23 
3.3 BUSINESS MANAGEMENT AND TEAMS ..............................................................................................24 
3.4 THE DISCIPLINE OF TEAMS..............................................................................................................25 
3.5 THE RELEVANCE OF A TEAM APPROACH TO INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS.................................................27 
3.6 SUMMARY AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSION .........................................................................................29 
Chapter 4 The empirical findings and the team approach...............................................................30 
4.1 NEW WARS AND AUGMENTED CHALLENGES .....................................................................................30 
4.2 HOW CAN DIVERSITY ENHANCE ANALYSIS?......................................................................................31 
4.3 MANAGING A DIVERSE WORKFORCE ................................................................................................33 
4.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ....................................................................34 
4.5 INTELLECTUAL SHORTCOMINGS AND ANALYSIS ................................................................................35 
4.6 THE TEAM APPROACH ....................................................................................................................37 
4.7 SUMMARY AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSION .........................................................................................39 
Chapter 5 The use of teams in intelligence analysis........................................................................41 
5.1 ARE THEY REALLY TEAMS?.............................................................................................................41 
5.2 HOW DOES THE USE OF TEAMS IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE? ........................................43 
5.3 TEAMS AS A RESOURCE IN MANAGING DIVERSITY IN THE WORKFORCE...............................................44 
5.4 FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSION..................................................................................................45 
Literature...............................................................................................................................................47 
Annex 1 .................................................................................................................................................49 
Annex 2 .................................................................................................................................................51 
           
 5 
 
 
            
          
 
 
 
1 Chapter 1 
Introduction  
 
1.1 Background  
"All men by nature desire to know.” are the opening words of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A quest for 
knowledge is also at the core of intelligence, though in a somewhat different form, as intelligence’s 
aim is to know about events that are yet to happen - to foretell. As Michael Herman puts it 
“Intelligence’s greatest value is as a guide to the future.” (Herman 2002:11). In Western democracies 
this important and challenging task is undertaken as an advisory activity in servitude to the 
government, or the constitution, be that directly to high-level political decision makers or more 
indirectly in a military context. In either case, it is far from an understatement to claim that 
undertaking to be a guide to the future is both complex and challenging. 
Failures of intelligence to foretell, and thus the failure to serve as a guide to the future, have led 
to many thoughts on how to improve its prediction capabilities. The search for explanations of why 
intelligence fails has identified a number of possible answers, to include discourse failure1 and the 
politicization of intelligence2. However, it is widely recognized that intelligence failures are most 
likely the consequences of intellectual shortcomings in individuals. 
In addition to the inherent challenge which lies in those shortcomings, the challenges in 
analysis are augmented further as analysts face a more complex geopolitical environment and the 
multifaceted complex conflicts, also known as new wars3. It is fair to claim that changes in the 
geopolitical environment as well as new wars have resulted in greater demands on UN members as 
well as NATO member states to provide military contributions to operations abroad. Such 
contributions may include on site intelligence analysis, and analysis thus faces yet another potential 
challenge - that of having to be carried out in a setting which in many cases is considerably more 
taxing and demanding that the normal daily working environment at home.  
In part due to the strong association with secrecy, a sense of specialness can be said to permeate 
intelligence and thus possibly render it resistant to influence from other fields of study. However, even 
seasoned intelligence professionals and scholars have acknowledged that intelligence can benefit from 
insight gained in other fields of study.4 Michael Herman has indicated an underlying question in the 
literature of how far intelligence can learn from business management, and following this he asked 
                                                
1 See for example Neuman & Smith (2005). 
2 See for example Lowenthal (2009:189). 
3 See for example Olsen (2007).  
4 See for example Phythian (2008:62). 
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“Does intelligence resemble the rest of the world or is it unique?” (Herman 1996:284). One may be 
tempted to answer Herman’s question with yes - intelligence is unique, and yes - in some areas it does 
resemble the rest of the world. In the latter case it could be interesting to further explore if there are 
methods or approaches to improving performance ‘in the rest of the world’ which can be applied into 
the former - the unique world of intelligence - and serve to improve it. Business management has 
identified the use of teams as one way of enhancing performance, and the relevance of a team 
approach to intelligence analysis is what will be explored in this thesis.  
 
1.2 Research question and brief outline 
This thesis will partially address Herman’s above question from a novel angle by aiming to answer the 
following research question:  
Is there something to learn from the use of teams in business management 
which can be used to improve the quality of intelligence analysis?  
By improved quality of intelligence analysis is meant the enhancement of the ability of analysts to 
make predictions which are more accurate, i.e. more successful in accurately describing the intensions 
of the opponents than what would have been the case without the use of teams. The work will be 
carried out according to the main structure outlined below:  
 
• This first chapter will further include a clarification on selected terminology, as well as a brief 
presentation of intelligence failure and the role of analysis.  
• The second chapter contains reflections on methodological challenges with emphasis on the 
collection of primary data.   
• The third chapter initially deals with the link between intelligence analysis and intellectual 
shortcomings, before proceeding to explore how something can be learned from the use of 
teams in business management from a theoretical perspective. The chapter also includes a more 
detailed description of teams.   
• In the fourth chapter the findings resulting from analysis of the collected empirical data is 
presented, and this empirical perspective completes the framework prior to the discussion in the 
final chapter.     
• The fifth chapter contains a discussion on the use of teams in intelligence analysis, before 
proceeding to final remarks and a conclusion pertaining to the research question. 
 
The remaining sections in this chapter will present clarification on relevant terminology before 
proceeding to briefly present intelligence failure and the role of analysis.  
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1.2 Briefly on intelligence 
Intelligence is a ubiquitous and important phenomenon, and this section will briefly present some key 
characteristics of intelligence in order to provide an initial overall frame before proceeding. The main 
activity of intelligence is information gathering and exploitation (Herman 1996:56). What sets 
intelligence apart from other information is both the special means which it can utilize to gain the 
desired information, and the study of particular subjects, most often foreign and military ones. In order 
to protect sources and methods, intelligence is also often shrouded in secrecy. The main reason for this 
is the vulnerability to countermeasures, which again reflects the reciprocity of intelligence. In its 
glossary of terms and definitions the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation describes intelligence as:  
The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, 
hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential 
operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to 
the organizations engaged in such activity. (NATO 2009:136).  
The above description provides reasonably good guidance as to what intelligence is about, and it is 
very clear on the role of information, the subjects of intelligence and how intelligence can be viewed 
as a product, but it is less precise in communicating certain other key characteristics of intelligence, as 
for example the secrecy and collection aspects. Another example of a definition of intelligence is the 
following from Peter Gill who proposed that intelligence is:  
[M]ainly secret activities – targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action – 
intended to enhance security and/or maintain power relative to competitors by 
forewarning of threats and opportunities. (Gill 2009:214)  
The purpose of including Gill’s definition here is merely to illustrate that there is more than one way to 
view or describe intelligence, but Gill’s inclusion of action in the suggested definition deserves further 
comment, which can be found in the next section.  
1.3 The essence of intelligence - an advisory role 
The essence of Western intelligence is to provide information and forecasts on which others take 
action, not taking action itself (Herman 1996:56). Even though there is some division among scholars 
as to whether the concept of intelligence should include taking action (Gill 2009:215) the work in this 
thesis rests on Herman’s (2006) view on the issue. Although covert action has confused public 
attitudes, there are general assumptions that intelligence’s proper role is advisory and not executive, 
and this is an important distinction between the liberal ‘Western’ concept and the role of intelligence in 
for example the former Soviet Union and other authoritarian regimes (Herman 2002:17-18). Although 
Herman mainly refers to intelligence at the strategic national level, the same principle applies to the 
role of intelligence in a Western military setting, i.e. that of intelligence as having an advisory and not 
an executive role, and the work in this thesis rests on the aforementioned view.  
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1.2 Strategic versus tactical intelligence  
In intelligence terms, there is a distinction between strategic versus tactical intelligence resources. 
Institutionally the former is the national and central departments and agencies, whereas the latter is an 
intelligence term for everything below the national, strategic level of control, under the control of 
military commands (Herman 1996:36). For example, the ‘theatre resources’ available to General 
Schwarzkopf in the Gulf War were ‘tactical’ in this sense, even though they served both the 
operational and strategic levels of command (Herman 1996:36).  
The classification of intelligence resources in intelligence terms differs from the military 
classification which corresponds with the different levels of command. For example the current NATO 
Glossary of Terms and Definitions (2009) contains descriptions of strategic, operational and tactical 
intelligence, directed towards describing at which level the product of intelligence is intended to serve.  
Strategic intelligence is “Intelligence required for the formulation of policy, military planning and the 
provision of indications and warning, at the national and/or international levels.” (NATO 2009: 215). 
Operational intelligence is “Intelligence required for the planning and conduct of campaigns at the 
operational level.” (NATO 2009: 173), and tactical intelligence is “Intelligence required for the 
planning and execution of operations at the tactical level. (NATO 2009: 220). 
This thesis will use the distinction between strategic and tactical intelligence with reference to 
both resources and product. Strategic intelligence is a national resource under central control, and 
produces for use at all levels according to needs and sources (Herman 1996: 123). Tactical intelligence 
is ‘local’, under sub-strategic control and is used at operational and tactical commands (Herman 
1996:123).  
 
1.4 The intelligence cycle, analysis and intelligence product  
The production of intelligence is often viewed as taking place within a cycle, and a dominant view is 
that of an intelligence cycle wherein the process is driven by user requirements and priorities, leading 
to an adjustment of collection to meet requirements, followed by collection and analysis, before 
disseminating the product (Herman 1996:284). This lends itself well to the metaphor of intelligence as 
an orderly process originating in users’ needs, but the cycle is in fact a military creation (Herman 
1996:286). A four stage intelligence cycle is also found in current NATO official texts, where the 
process is described as a cycle consisting of the four phases direction, collection, processing and 
dissemination (NATO 2009: 136) and where analysis is described as:  
In intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which 
information is subjected to review in order to identify significant facts for subsequent 
interpretation. (NATO 2009:57) 
In this work, when using the word analysis, what is referred to is known as all-source intelligence 
analysis, which is not limited to the strategic level but also can take place at the tactical level. Even 
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though the scope and amount of information available for analysts may differ between the two levels, 
the point is that all-source analysis draws on available information to produce ‘finished intelligence’.5 
The essence of all-source analysis is “the special responsibility for authoritative intelligence 
judgements.” (Herman 1999:109), and a key element in such analysis is the ability to see things 
through the target’s eyes (Herman 1999: 109).  
Finished intelligence come in different shapes and sizes, but are often known as estimates or 
assessment, terms which are often used in connection with the strategic level and long term 
intelligence. In this work the word predictions will be used, as it reflects both the tactical level from 
which the empirical findings originate as well as the foretelling aspect of the product.  
Now it is time to move closer to the core of this thesis, and so the attention will shift towards 
intelligence failure and the role of analysis.       
  
1.5 Intelligence failure  
In Sherman Kent’s words “Intelligence is bound to make mistakes.” (Kent 1949:194) and other 
scholars have pointed out that “The possible failure of intelligence to assess a situation correctly is a 
danger coeval with intelligence itself.” (Shulsky and Schmitt 2002:62). When intelligence makes 
mistakes, it fails to be a valuable guide to the future and thus diminishes in value to its users.  
The best known variety of intelligence failure is warning failure, in particular against surprise 
attack in peacetime and as war initiation (Herman 1996:221). Another situation, closely related to 
warning failure is when a nation expects an attack but due to “a serious misestimation of where or how 
it will occur, responds disadvantageously.” (Shulsky and Schmitt 2002:62). Intelligence failure also 
includes longer running misjudgements, such as the mistakes of the US intelligence community in 
assessing the Soviet intentions and military capabilities during the Cold War (Herman 1996:222). The 
failure of intelligence to forecast political coups and regime changes is another damaging surprise a 
nation may suffer, and this can be a “serious blow to a nation’s foreign policy interest.” (Shulsky and 
Schmitt 2002:62). In the words of Shulsky and Schmitt  
An intelligence failure is essentially a misunderstanding of the situation that leads to 
government (or its military forces) to take actions that are inappropriate and 
counterproductive to its own interests. (Shulsky and Schmitt 2002:63) 
The above quote points to the importance of understanding a situation correctly and failure to do so 
can occur at both the strategic and the tactical level of intelligence. The need to reduce the likelihood 
of such failure is therefore an important part of greater efforts to ensure optimum policy and military 
responses.   
 
                                                
5 See for example Herman (1996: pp. 42-43, pp.100-112, p. 379).   
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1.6 Causes of failure and the role of analysis  
In the search for determining causes of failure scholars have identified several possible answers, and 
the main distinction is between causes which are primarily exogenous to the intelligence organization 
versus those which are primarily endogenous. Of the exogenous, one of the most notable ones are 
when the mistake rests with “the decision makers who consume the products of intelligence services.” 
(Betts 2009:87). Another exogenous cause is discourse failure which sees intelligence failure in 
connection with a broader atmosphere of complacency.6 However, academics that focus on the role of 
the intelligence community in intelligence failures, and not the role of the policymaking community, 
tend to believe that analysts are to blame for intelligence failures (Kuhns 2003:83). Although one does 
not precisely know the percentage of failures due to collection deficiencies versus analytical failure, 
Kuhns states that a number of important failures have been identified where the problem seems to be 
principally analytical (Kuhns 2003:84). This is supported by Bar Joseph, which in connection with the 
Yom Kippur case states that:  
the evidence supports the dominant school in the study of surprise attacks, that the incorrect 
comprehension of the meaning of available information prior to attack, rather than the lack of 
such information, is the principal cause for such failure (Bar Joseph 2003:184).  
The view that analysis is at core of intelligence failure is also supported by Shulsky and Schmitt:  
Aside from instances in which relevant information cannot be obtained at all, 
intelligence failure refers to a disorder of the analytical process that causes data to be 
ignored or misinterpreted. (Shulsky and Schmitt 2002:64)   
The above quotes substantiates that intelligence analysis is a relevant topic to explore within the area 
of intelligence failure. It should be noted that the quotes primarily revolve around strategic 
intelligence, but nevertheless they point out that the challenges in improving intelligence lies closer to 
analysis than to collection. The above thus indicate that efforts to improve intelligence analysis would 
be of value, at whatever level of intelligence. However, not all scholars agree with the interpretation of 
the relevance of improving analysis.  
For example, Richard K. Betts claims that the belief that intelligence disasters can be avoided 
by perfecting norms and procedures in analysis is illusory and that such a belief could be dangerous if 
it leads to a belief that systemic reforms will increase the predictability of threats (Betts 2009:87). In 
his view, intelligence can be improved marginally, but not radically, by altering the analytical system. 
(Betts 2009:87). The aim of this thesis is not to argue for a radical change of the analytical system, nor 
to suggest new norms or procedures in analysis. The aim is to explore how reflections on the discipline 
of teams in a business management context can be of value in improving the quality of intelligence, to 
the benefit of the users. In an activity as significant and ubiquitous as intelligence even a marginal 
improvement should be welcomed.  
                                                
6 See for example Neumann & Smith (2005) 
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2 Chapter 2 
Methodological challenges 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the main methodological considerations in the study. Section 
2.1 contains a brief presentation of the overarching approach to the research, before in section 2.2 
commenting on the two-tiered approach of using a theoretical and an empirical perspective. As the 
main methodological challenges in this study lie in the collection of the empirical data, significant 
emphasis is placed on providing a solid account of the various decisions involved in designing the 
method of collecting and analyses of the data, and this spans across sections 2.3 through 2.13. The 
final point in this chapter is the discussion on validity in section 2.14.  
 
2.1 Exploratory research  
Although it is recognized among some scholars that other fields of study can lend value to intelligence, 
the approach in this thesis is a novel one and the connections it seeks to explore are not widely 
addressed in neither in intelligence nor in business literature. This clearly points to the need for 
flexibility in the research process, and thus clearly indicates the appropriateness of an exploratory 
approach. A main benefit of this approach is also that it allows for an adjustment of the angle of the 
work, even after data has been collected.  
 
2.2 A two-tiered approach 
The research is carried out in two main steps. The first one has a theoretical approach and draws on 
both intelligence and business management literature. This consequently leads to some tentative 
conclusions, which rest solely on a theoretical foundation. Therefore the second main step is empirical, 
and draws on interviews with people who are thought to have knowledge of the challenges 
encountered in and inherent to intelligence analysis. The most significant methodological challenges in 
this work lie within the design and implementation of the collection of primary data, and this will 
therefore be the main focus of the ensuing deliberating on methodological challenges.  
 
2.3 Written versus verbal method of collection of data  
The primary data I wanted to obtain was personal accounts, impressions and points of view of 
intelligence personnel in a military setting. As new wars have briefly been mentioned as one of the 
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elements of the greater context for intelligence analysis, the personnel would preferably also have first 
hand experience in performing intelligence analysis in such a challenging environment.   
The information could be acquired by using either a written or a verbal method (Andersson 
1995:23). The use of a written method would in this case entail a massive amount of work in preparing 
adequately detailed documentation to address the questions at hand, and it would also preclude a 
flexible and dynamic approach in the interaction with the subjects who were to provide the data. This 
pointed in the direction of using interviewing as a method, but when in search of specific information 
other methods than interviews can also be of use, for example participatory observation which in some 
cases may even provide more correct information of what actually takes place than interviews would 
(Andersson 1995:19). However, the value of this added value must be weighed against the time and 
cost required to conduct it (Andersson 1995:19-20). In this case the relevance of participatory 
observation may be questioned, but as it was clear from the onset that time restraints did not allow for 
the securing of adequate observational opportunities, this method was not an option to be considered.   
I therefore decided to use interviews as the method for collecting data. This again requires 
some specific methodological considerations, one of which is to consider which type of interview will 
be the most suitable. There are several types of interviews, of which some main categories are 
telephone interviews, group interviews and individual interviews (Andersson 1995:23) and they will 
be discussed later, as the following section will deal with the selection of interviewees.  
 
2.4 Selection of interviewees and ethical considerations 
The selection of interviewees should ideally be part of a deliberate selection process. In this case 
preferred interviewees would be personnel currently or recently employed in intelligence analysis in a 
military context. Initially, rather than seeking to interview a selection of people with complementary 
roles in intelligence, the intention was to obtain interviews with several people with the same or very 
similar backgrounds as analysts. On the other hand, as long as the interviewees have relevant 
intelligence background, it can also be an advantage to interview personnel outside but close to 
analysis, as this may provide broader and complementary perspectives, and this is the approach I opted 
for.  
The desired type of interviewees limited my ability to select them myself, mainly as there is 
often sensitivity issues involved when people from outside the intelligence community attempt to 
obtain contact with such personnel. Thus I was reliant upon assistance from an undisclosed point of 
contact in order to gain access to the desired type of interviewees. This does not mean that it was a 
sample of convenience, as the selection in part rested upon an initial sketch of this project as well as on 
the aforementioned considerations regarding the composition of the sample. In that sense the selection 
of interviewees was to a certain extent the result of a deliberate and specific selection process, even it 
could not be carried out directly by me.  
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The interviewees in this study are personnel from the tactical level of an intelligence 
organisation in the Norwegian Armed Forces, and they are either all-source intelligence analysts or are 
working in positions closely associated with such analysis in the same intelligence organisation.  It was 
part of the arrangement that the interviewees would remain anonymous throughout the process, and as 
a result no personal data has been processed or collected in this work.  
The information that I seek to obtain through the interviews are experiences, points of view and 
opinions of people who have first hand experience in working within intelligence analysis or closely 
associated work. This type of information can be collected and analysed even if personal data of the 
interviewees is not collected or included in the analysis. However, that is not the preferred approach as 
it reduces the ability to trace and verify findings. In this case, however, that weakness had to be 
accepted in order to secure access to relevant sources for the interviews.  
  
2.5 Selection of type of interview  
Now that the selection of interviewees has been explained, it is time to return to the selection of type of 
interview. If the interview is relatively limited and the questions are uncomplicated, a telephone 
interview is a possible solution (Andersson 1995:24). If the questions are designed to obtain simple 
facts, then making a call or sending an e-mail would be suitable (Repstad 2007:98). An advantage of 
conducting for example a telephone interviews is that it enables one to carry out a number of 
interviews with relatively little use of time, as it does not require the use of time to travel to and from 
interviewees, and it is also often a relatively low-cost method (Andersson 1995:24). However, this 
method not only entails that the interviews become impersonal, but also results in the loss of some of 
the advantages in personal interviews such as for example the opportunity to interpret the information 
conveyed through body language (Andersson 1995:24). As the questions in this case revolves around 
issues such as cognitive processes and human interaction, it is fair to assume that the questions will 
deal with aspects that are too complex to be properly addressed in a somewhat impersonal telephone 
interview or in an e-mail, and therefore these methods were rejected.  
In this case, a group interview may at first glance appear to be an interesting option. Such a 
method not only carries with it the appeal of possible cost-efficiency and economy of effort, but it also 
allows the different members of the group to comment upon each other statements. At the same time it 
is important to be aware that a group interview also has some drawbacks. One such drawback is that 
groups are often dominated by one or a couple of persons, and another is that some people may be 
uncomfortable speaking in a group setting and consequently their potential contributions may go 
undisclosed (Andersson 1995:25). In addition, there is the risk that people respond differently in a 
group interview than they would in an individual one, as they are aware that the other members of the 
group expect a certain type of answers (Andersson 1995:25). A group interview is suitable in cases 
where the group is reasonably aligned and without significant internal conflict (Repstad 2007:100).  
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Nevertheless a group interview was not selected in this case, mainly because I believe that I would 
obtain more information from the interviewees in individual settings than in a group setting, as the 
possibility to dwell on the views and experiences of one interviewee is better exploited in an individual 
setting. In addition, if opting for a group interview, I would loose the possible cumulative effect that 
similar answers to the same questions by different people can have on the data. This deserves some 
comment in light of the possible effect the interviewees may have on each other, but this will be 
included in a later section.  
The reason for choosing a verbal method over a written one is often that the interviewer wants 
to be in close contact with the interviewee and seeks to conduct the interview much like a conversation 
wherein adaptations can be made underway, to include the possibility to rephrase questions 
(Andersson 1995:24). I believe that these benefits are optimized in an individual interview, and thus 
this becomes the final point in the process leading to the decision to use individual interviews to 
collect information from primary sources.   
 
2.6 The number of interviewees  
Another pertinent question is how many interviewees are required in order for the obtained 
information to be reliable for the purpose of the study (Andersson 1995:21). As this thesis aims to 
explore aspects that may be relevant to intelligence analysis, and as the outlook is strongly associated 
with military matters, it was desirable to interview people who currently are or previously were 
engaged in such work in a military context. However both time restraints and the potential sensitivities 
involved in any intelligence matter made it clear that extensive interviews with a large number of 
interviewees was not a viable option.  
This is not necessarily a negative thing, as there is no standard reply to how many interviews 
must be carried out in qualitative studies, and this must be determined in each specific case (Repstad 
2007:84). Furthermore, a project usually benefits from conducting more thorough analyses of view 
interviews rather than superficially analysing many (Repstad 2007:84). In dialogue with my point of 
contact in the intelligence organization we agreed on a number of interviewees at their discretion, - 
preferably somewhere between five and ten, and in the end it turned out to be six.  
 
2.7 Structure of interviews  
Interviews may vary from being very rigidly controlled to being very loosely structured (Andersson 
1995:25). The former entails that all questions, areas of questioning and their order are predetermined, 
and the interviewer merely has to read them out loud and note the answers (Andersson 1995:76). Such 
an interview could serve to ensure that all desired topics are covered, but on the other hand it seems 
rigid and not flexible enough to be able to pursue topics of interest which may emerge during the 
course of the interviews. A loosely structured interview may seem more appealing as it allows for an 
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adaptive and more spontaneous setting, but on the other hand the interviewer runs the risk that the 
desired topics or sub-topics are not being adequately addressed (Andersson 1995:77). If the interview 
is conducted by simply letting it run as a regular conversation, it is termed an unstructured interview, 
even though the interviewer most often has a clear perception of what he or she wants to get from the 
interview (Andersson 1995:77).  
More common than this latter type of interview is the semi-structured interview, where the 
subject of the interview as well as the type of desired information has been decided in advance 
(Andersson 1995:77). However the exact questions and sequence of the different themes have not been 
decided, but depend upon the development of the conversation on a case by case basis (Andersson 
1995:77). Such interviews are also termed qualitative interviews, they are well suited to collect 
information which is difficult to obtain through other means and the method allows for the emergence 
of new and unforeseen aspects during the course of the interview (Jacobsen 1993:19).  
There needs to be an underlying system of what topics are to be addressed during the course of 
the interviews and such a purpose can be served by an interview guide. Such a guide often contains 
some main questions, some prepared sub-questions and maybe some alternative questions, but the 
guide does imply the pursuit of a slavish plan (Repstad 2007:78). It can be an advantage if the 
interview guide is built on cues and key words, free from questions formulated in detail, as this 
requires the interviewer to formulate the statements during the course of the interview which will then 
subsequently more resemble a normal conversation (Repstad 2007:78). A purpose of using a guide is 
to assist in ensuring that all interviewees meet relevant and comparable themes and ensure that the 
interviews are structured enough to be processed and compared to each other (Jacobsen 1993:19).  
I have no formal training or experience in conducting interviews in a research setting. This may 
be a weakness as it may preclude me from being able to optimize the potential value of the interview, 
which again points in the direction of a more structured rather than a loosely structured or unstructured 
interview. Nevertheless a rigidly controlled interview would in my opinion not be best suited in this 
case, as it would preclude the ability to allow the interviewees to bring up and elaborate on aspects that 
are relevant but which have not been included in the prepared questions. Therefore I will use a semi-
structured interview as it allows for the desired flexibility in the interview setting while at the same 
time making use of an interview guide to ensure that all the prior selected themes are addressed in each 
of the interviews.  
 
2.8 Working with the interview guide 
During the work on determining what the interview guide should look like, it became clear that there is 
no predetermined answer as to what exactly a semistructured interview guide should contain. Thus it 
necessary to tailor the interview guide to the specific interview situation. One possibility is to simply 
present a grand tour question supplemented with floating prompts (Leech 2002). Although this 
tempting option requires little advance preparation of questions and can potentially lead to a plethora 
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of information, such an approach would probably require a more experienced interviewer than me, and 
could also entail a less precise interview and considerable more work in sifting through the material 
post-interview. Even so, in my situation a grand tour question can be useful in the early phase of an 
interview, as the interviewees response to such a question can potentially yield valuable information 
on nuances in the topics that he or she is comfortable speaking about and is specifically interested in, 
which again can be of value to me as I decide how best to progress in each interview.  
As the use of specific questions may be helpful for the inexperienced researcher (Lüders), such 
an approach seems suitable in my case. However, if followed too mechanically, an interview guide can 
interrupt the conversational flow of the interview and should therefore be kept as a background check-
list (Lüders). In order to contribute to a calm interview setting, provide the best opportunity for the 
interviewee to contribute with reflections and associations, as well as addressing my need to be able to 
make adequate notes, I chose to construct an interview guide which emphasises the simplicity of few 
main questions combined with a longer list of possible follow-up questions which can also serve as a 
check-list if the desired topics have been addressed.  
As the interviews were carried out in Norwegian, the interview guide was written in 
Norwegian, see annex 1. This allowed for an easy flow of questions and answers during the interviews. 
In order to facilitate readability of the interview guide for the English language reader, I have 
translated it into English, see Annex 2. The translation was target language oriented and intended to 
enable English language readers to get an impression of the approach of the guide, more than aiming to 
be an exact English language replica of the Norwegian version.  
 
2.9 Recording the data   
When interviewing, the use of tape recorders is the method of choice by many researchers and the 
method has many advantages, but one disadvantage is that some respondents seem to be almost 
allergic to them  (Repstad 2007:84-85). Another option is to take hand written notes, and the use of 
such a method can have an impact on the tempo on the interview, the interviewee is likely to be more 
attentive to wording and be more reflective , and the concentration of the participants improves (Häger 
2001:139). This does not mean that using hand written notes are without challenges. It may necessitate 
that the interviewer will have to briefly pause the process to take down a quote, and there must be time 
available shortly after the interview to complete the notes with more comprehensive text while the 
interview remains fresh in ones mind  (Häger 2001:140).  
However, it is not only a matter of my preference and methodological suitability, the 
preferences of the interviewees must also be taken into consideration. In this case the question was 
quickly resolved when it became clear that the interviewees preferred that the information be recorded 
by hand written notes rather than by the use of a tape recorder.   
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Rather than traditional note-taking, I will rely on the use of mind-maps7 during the interviews. This 
will allow for great flexibility both with regard to looping back and allowing cross referencing merely 
by the use of an arrow. This is a method which I have used extensively both during studies and in work 
settings, and in it allows me to process large amounts of information in a quick and efficient manner, 
and it does not preclude me from noting exact quotes or pertinent points as part of the recording 
process. In order to reap the full benefits of the notes I will endeavour to make a more comprehensive 
full text version of the notes as soon as possible following each of the interviews.  
The interviews were carried out in Norwegian, and the mind-map notes were also made in 
Norwegian. In the transcription process the data was translated into English in order to render it usable 
for this work. I recognize that this is a possible source of error, but not so significant that it has a 
decisive negative impact on the value of the data. 
 
2.10 Effect of interviewer and interviewees 
An interview is an interaction between at least two people wherein both interviewer and interviewee 
react on and affect each other (Starrin and Renck 1996:58). This entails that both the interviewer and 
the interviewee in different ways will have an impact on the interview and the information derived 
from it. In this section I will briefly highlight some aspects of such influences, but it should be noted 
that this is merely a reflection on awareness of such aspects and is not intended to be an exhaustive 
account of all such effects.  
As part of the efforts to secure access to relevant interviewees, I provided my point of contact 
with an early sketch of the approach to the work. This was a necessary and decisive point in securing 
access to the interviewees, yet I recognize that already at this point the influence of the interviewer on 
the outcome of the interviews was at work.   
The people I interviewed worked in a military intelligence setting. I do not have experience 
from working in an intelligence organization, and my academic knowledge of the topic of intelligence 
is from the intelligence studies course at the Norwegian Defence University College in the fall of 
2008. On one hand this may be viewed as a weakness as I have limited insight into the finer inner 
workings of intelligence and intelligence analysis. On the other hand it can be viewed as an asset as I 
will most likely approach the situation without deeply entrenched preconceptions.  
The interviewees can also have an impact on the interview process. One example of this is the 
possible mutual influencing of the interviewees on each other prior to or during the interview process. 
The people I interviewed were intelligence personnel in the same military unit. They probably work in 
close proximity to each other, and there is the possibility that they had, even unintentionally, 
influenced each others responses as a result of having talked to each other about the upcoming 
sessions, and if known - the topic at hand. In this case, primarily for practical reasons the interviews 
were carried out within a relatively limited timeframe, i.e. in the course of one afternoon and the 
                                                
7 See for example Buzan (2004).  
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following day. A side effect of this is that it reduced the likelihood of extensive mutual interviewee 
influencing, as for example compared to a situation where the interviews were scattered across a two 
or three week period.  
Illustrated by the above it must be kept in mind that the information gained from the interviews 
is the result of interactive processes between people who are being influenced by a number of 
contextual factors. Thus the information obtained cannot avoid being of a subjective nature. That does 
not render the information useless, but one must keep in mind that absolute truth is unlikely to be 
derived from qualitative interviews.  
 
2.11 Summing up the method of collecting data   
The method which was used to collect information from primary sources in this thesis was qualitative 
semi-structured individual interviews of six persons currently working in intelligence analysis or 
closely related activities in a military setting at the tactical level. An interview guide was used to assist 
in ensuring that the interviewees meet relevant and comparable themes and in order to allow for 
processing and comparison of results. During the interviews the information was recorded by using 
hand written mind map notes, which was transcribed as soon as possible following each interview.  
Although I am aware that the information obtained was of a subjective nature, through analysis 
it is intended to serve to enhance the basis for deciding whether there are adequate grounds for 
believing that reflections on the discipline of teams in a business management context can improve the 
quality of intelligence analysis.   
 
2.12 Post-interview reflections 
The interviews were conducted in a location which was familiar to the interviewees and in which 
outside disturbances were very limited. After the interviews were completed it was clear to me that the 
interview guide had room for improvement. I had used what could be termed an indirect approach in 
designing the guide, in the sense that the guide did not contain direct questions on teams, but rather 
questions on a number of closely associated topics enabling the use of a broader angle than if I had 
only used specific questions on teams. Even so, the atmosphere during the interviews, along with the 
possibility of adjusting the angle of the questions and asking supplemental ad-hoc questions, yielded 
ample relevant data. The challenge was to sort through the material and be able to distil the most 
relevant information for this work.  
The use of personal interviews and a semistructured approach allowed for the pursuit of 
emerging topics during the interviews, something which proved very useful as this was a directly 
contributing factor in obtaining specific data on the use of a team approach to intelligence analysis at 
the tactical level. In retrospect much could have been gained from also including some specific 
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questions on teams in the interview guide, but the interview setting and the semi-structured approach 
allowed for an ad-hoc correction of this flaw.  
 
2.13 Analysing the collected data  
After having transcribed the answers to the questions, I read through the material before I grouped the 
answers from all the interviewees together according to which main or sub-question the respective 
answer belonged to. I then repeatedly read through the grouped collections of answers, before taking 
note of the commonalities within the grouping of answers being examined. After having completed 
this task, I went through the material again looking for perspectives which were only mentioned by a 
single interviewee, in order to be able to consider whether that reply seemed to be of a significance 
which entailed that it should be included in the data subjected to further analysis.   
There were notable differences in how the interviewees responded to the questions. For 
example, some provided broad answers and some used narratives or examples more than others. 
Therefore I also went through the material in order ensure that the answers were grouped correctly 
according to topic and not only by question. This way I could avoid interesting information from 
falling through the cracks simply as a result of not primarily belonging in the context of a specific 
question. 
The approach carries with it the risk that some relevant findings or important point may be may 
be excluded from the analysis. However, as a semi-structured interview was used to collect the 
information, an all-encompassing inclusion of the collected primary data would be too exhaustive for 
the scope of this study. I have made every effort to sift out the main commonalities as well as finer 
individual points which best fit the perspective in this thesis. In addition, as access to such a selection 
of interviewees is far from a daily occurrence, I also recorded findings which were interesting even if 
they are not directly of relevance to the central question of this work. Such findings may at some point 
be the object of attention for further exploration. Therefore it may prove valuable to have them on 
record, but any use of them would require the permission of the unit which provided access to the 
interviewees. 
 
2.14 Validity  
The validity of the research depends on the soundness of the findings. The degree to which the 
research has succeeded in measuring what it set out to measure, i.e. if the findings can be said to be 
correct, describes the internal validity of the research (Jacobsen 2005:213-214). Challenges to internal 
validity are often associated with obtaining the right sources and their ability or will to reveal correct 
information (Jacobsen 2005:212-215).  
The two-tiered approach to the research serves to enhance the validity of the findings. The first 
step explores the question from a theoretical angle based on available literature, and provides 
substantiation for the tentative findings on a theoretical foundation. These findings have been further 
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substantiated by the empirical findings resulting from the analysis of the collected data, and the 
collection method of these data was subjected to careful consideration as presented in the above 
sections in this chapter.  
The interviewees in this work were all working in intelligence analysis or other closely related 
functions in an intelligence organization at the tactical level of the Norwegian Armed Forces. 
Although there were only six interviewees, they are knowledgeable about the task and challenges 
encountered in such analysis. Furthermore, it also turned out that they had first-hand experience from 
working in or closely with integrated intelligence analysis teams at the tactical level, deployed in 
operations abroad. Thus the interviewees possessed very relevant knowledge and insight about issues 
connected to the question that this work sets out to answer, and shared this insight during the 
interviews. 
When dealing with the topic of intelligence, the motivations for providing information can be 
varied and one must always be vary to the possibility of some form of deception, also when carrying 
out interviews with intelligence personnel. However, in this case an assumption of possible deception 
would entail that I did not trust the interviewees to adhere to known ethical and professional standards, 
and if so I should not be relying on them as sources. The value of the information collected for the 
purpose of this thesis by method of interviews therefore rests on the assumption that the interviewees 
responded in good faith. 
Based on the two-tiered theoretical and empirical approach, the high relevance of the 
interviewees vis-à-vis the topic of the study, the reliance on the information in the interviews being 
provided in good faith, as well as the careful design of the collection method of the primary data, the 
internal validity is considered to be strong.   
The degree to which the findings can be generalized to a wider context describes the external 
validity of the findings (Jacobsen 2005:213-214). However, “the value of qualitative research lies in 
the particular description and themes developed in context of a specific site” (Creswell 2009:193). 
Generalization is then to a greater extent a result of qualitative researchers having studied additional 
cases and generalizing these findings to the new cases (Creswell 2009:193). In light of this the external 
validity of the findings in this work will be considered.  
The findings in this study rest on the aforementioned two-tiered approach, and much of the 
external validity depends on a wider representativeness of the sources which provided the primary 
data. It has already been determined that the representativeness of the interviewees is viewed as being 
high, and the approach to the collection of data has been described in great detail.  
The question of the representativeness of the unit as grounds for making greater generalizations 
is however another matter. The unit is relatively small, flexible and adaptable, it enjoys a considerable 
amount of autonomy in deciding how to approach the work, and so far the team approach has primarily 
been exploited in operations abroad in a complex conflict setting. These aspects have been important 
factors in allowing the unit to explore the suitability of a team approach to analysis, but a pertinent 
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question is if these are also prerequisites for being able to exploit the benefits of teams in intelligence 
analysis.  
The external validity with regard to generalising the findings to be applicable also for other all-
source intelligence analysis at the tactical level while deployed abroad in operations is leaning towards 
being strong. With regard to generalizing at the strategic level, the external validity is more uncertain. 
As all-source analysis at both the tactical and the strategic level is about using collected information 
and subsequently process it into finished intelligence, it is not immediately apparent why a team 
approach to analysis cannot be suitable also at the strategic level. However, to reach such a conclusion 
on the material in this thesis would be presumptuous due to the characteristics of the unit which 
provided the sources for the primary data.   
Based on the above the external validity is considered to be good for the tactical level of 
intelligence, but more uncertain for the strategic level of intelligence. Further study on the relevance of 
the use of teams in intelligence analysis in a wider context would have to be carried out before a claim 
of wider generalization can be made.  
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3 Chapter 3 
What can be learned from the use of teams in business 
management? 
 
This chapter employs a theoretical perspective to the research question: Is there something to learn 
from the use of teams in business management which can be used to improve the quality of 
intelligence analysis? In section 3.1 the connection between intelligence analysis and a form of 
intellectual breakdown is outlined, as this is a core issue which should be addressed when attempting 
to improve intelligence analysis. In section 3.2 the attention shifts to the approaches that have been 
used to address the inherent intellectual or cognitive weakness in analysis, to include reflections on to 
what degree the use of teams have been considered as a remedy. Section 3.3 contains an introduction 
to business management and the use of teams, and in 3.4 the discipline of teams is outlined in greater 
detail. This sets the stage for the argument in section 3.5 that a team approach to analysis can be a 
useful. The final section in the chapter contains a summary of the main points and a tentative 
conclusion.  
 
3.1 Intelligence analysis and intellectual breakdown  
The literature conveys two general conclusions with regard to intelligence failure, first that the weak 
link is in analysis rather than collection, and second that the weakness in analysis has a recurrent 
quality which is linked to a form of intellectual breakdown (Herman 1996: 227-228). The object of 
attention here is the latter, which has to do with how people absorb and process information: 
People interpret data through images, historical analogies, personal experiences and 
other hypotheses. There is a cognitive rigidity about the way they fit information into 
these patterns. They see what they expect to see; they come to conclusions too early and 
stick to them for too long. (Herman 1996:228) 
The emphasis on intellectual explanations to intelligence failure is reflected in the focus on individual 
calibre in intelligence analysis (Herman 1996:228). Others have concluded that the decisive factor in 
the future, as it has been in the past, is the quality of analysts, and that the selection and training of the 
right recruits can be a partial remedy (Herman 1996:228). Suggestions have also been made to loosen 
analytical shackles, but in spite of a number of prescriptions on how to avoid failure, the main 
conclusions remain that the shortcomings are intellectual, and that the root causes are weaknesses in 
human perception and cognition (Herman 1996:230). As described by Richards Heuer: 
Of the diverse problems that impede accurate intelligence analysis, those inherent in 
human mental processes are surely among the most important and most difficult to deal 
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with. Intelligence analysis is fundamentally a mental process, but understanding this 
process is hindered by the lack of conscious awareness of the workings of our own 
minds. (Heuer 1999:1) 
In recognition of the inherent weaknesses in human cognition, proposals for improvement have the 
same focus: how to make individuals better analysts, by devising methods to designed to counteract 
the distortive impact of intellectual shortcomings on analysis. 
3.2 Has the use of teams been considered a remedy?   
One example of a method designed to counteract such distortive impact on analysis is the concept of 
Alternative Competing Hypotheses (ACH).8 Another tool is the use of competing teams in analysis, 
and the use of devil’s advocate as a way of challenging analysis: 
A common, almost reflective response to charges of “mindset” and “groupthink” is to 
establish separate, offline components specifically charged with thinking “out of the 
box”, or “red-team alternative analysis.” These are well-intentioned and potentially 
valuable measures. But an evaluation needs to be made as to whether their effectiveness 
is at risk of being undermined by a fundamental cognitive bias of its own. (MacEachin 
2005:130) 
The bias that MacEachin refers to in the above quote is how products which are the result of 
assignments to produce “out of the box ideas” are often viewed with a predisposition to see it as a 
result of a work designed to “come up with crazy ideas that have little to do with the real world”, and 
are consequently often put on the back burner by the receiver (MacEachin 2005: 129). In cases where 
alternative analysis has been embedded in line analysis and production, the impacts of such efforts 
have been enhanced (MacEachin 2005:129). Bowman H. Miller argues that intelligence demands a 
commitment to lifelong learning and continued education, and that all-source intelligence can be 
improved by filling the knowledge gap:  
Knowing one’s adversaries or workings smoothly with one’s friends without sufficient 
knowledge of their cultures, histories, politics, economics, resources, and language is 
next to impossible. (Miller 2008: 343) 
Thus it is necessary to recruit analysts from a diverse background with regard to fields of study. But as 
stated by Miller, once recruited it is necessary to ensure that adequate time and resources are devoted 
to expanding and using the expertise of the analysts (Miller 2008: 339).  
Only occasionally are there allusions in the literature to the potential role of teamwork in 
improving intelligence. One example of this is from Michael Herman who highlights that there is a 
demonstrated value of “small groups without much hierarchy” (Herman 1996:237), and also that 
“small size and flat structures put a special premium on talent and expertise.” (Herman 1996:237). 
                                                
8 See for example Heuer (1999).  
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Herman here clearly indicates that high-quality analysis does not depend on large numbers of staff, but 
more on a small number of the right people being able to work in an environment without the restraints 
of hierarchy. However, Herman’s mention of groups in this context is not the same as a team approach. 
He merely points to certain dynamics which are favourable for intelligence assessment, but does not 
refine this point further. So although one might at first glance one might get the impression that he is 
speaking about teams, he merely tangents on this very relevant discipline.  
Another example of alluding to the value of teams in intelligence is from Miller (2008), who 
argues that more team-based analysis is needed, as “no single analyst can be expected to be 
sufficiently knowledgeable in a broad array of different disciplines.” (Miller 2008:345). Miller’s focus 
here is primarily on the need to create a setting which is conducive to exploiting the complementary 
areas of knowledge of the analysts. He fails to be more specific on what he means with ‘team-based’, 
and thus renders the reader unable to discern if he is actually speaking of teams or if he is in fact 
merely speaking of groups.  
So far, however, no in-depth discussion on the team factor seems to have been carried out, but a 
more in-depth exploration of this factor is well worth trying.  
 
3.3 Business management and teams 
So where to go for theoretical reflection and sustained analytical interest in teams? Business 
management literature contains a solid amount of theoretical reflections on a number of management 
issues, to include teams. An in-depth elaboration on business management will not be carried out here 
but as is illustrated by the following quote, business is a context different from that of intelligence:   
Business management is the process of the planning, co-ordination and control of a 
business. To survive in the long run, a business must be profitable and liquid. To do so, 
it must create sufficient value for its customers so that its revenues exceed its total costs. 
The overall task of business management is to address successfully the problems that 
confront a business in its role as a value-creating organization. (The Canadian 
Encyclopedia 2009) 
The above quote points to several aspects which are central in a business context: One is the wide 
scope of tasks that is encompassed by such management, which for example can include cost 
accounting, marketing, strategy, logistics and human resource management. Another is the aim of 
business which is to create value in terms of profit. However, when responding to change is crucial, 
success depends upon forms of organization that promote information flow, and private “firms in 
rapidly changing environments succeed because they are better at learning and applying information 
than their competitors. They have such features as ‘flat’ structures, project teams, matrix 
responsibilities, and fluidity and apparent untidiness.". (Herman 1996:331) 
Herman claims that intelligence’s environment also has its large elements of change because it 
has to deal with the constant modifications in its targets defences in a manner which he claims “is 
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rather like dealing with competition and market changes in a volatile private sector.” (Herman 1996: 
331). Therefore the need for flexibility, opportunism and entrepreneurial drive in intelligence 
organizations can be interpreted in the direction that they would benefit from freer information flow 
within the organization (Herman 1996:331-332), which again could point to the relevance of modern 
management theory to intelligence. In addition, one has to consider the augmented challenges in 
intelligence analysis which come as a result of the complex conflicts of our time, also known as new 
wars (Olsen 2007), which must be said to qualify as a major element of change relevant to both 
strategic and tactical intelligence. However, security requirements limit the spread of information 
within an intelligence organization, and there are operational pulls in the hierarchical and formal 
direction (Herman 1996:332).  
Even so, both settings - business and intelligence - can be said to involve people with 
complementary knowledge who work together within the framework of an organization to create a 
product which is of high value to someone outside the organization or unit. Wherever people are 
involved in group efforts, the dynamics of interaction between them is likely to have some impact on 
the process and the quality of the product in the organization. So business has enough in common with 
intelligence to make a connection between the two fields potentially useful. One such potential useful 
area is the discipline of teams.  
But what exactly is a team? Many have at some point in their working lives been told or have 
believed that they were part of a team. But were they really? A team is not just any group working 
together, and groups do not become teams simply because that is the label someone puts on them 
(Katzenbach and Smith 1993:112). Real teams that work differs from amorphous groups which we 
often call teams simply because we “think the label is motivating and energizing.” (Katzenbach and 
Smith 1993:111). Thus it is time to explore what insights business management research has yielded 
on ways to make teamwork function well.   
 
3.4 The discipline of teams  
So what insights does business management literature provide about what the prerequisites are for a 
high-performing team? Here I will take a closer look at some of the indicators which can assist in 
determining if one is dealing with merely a working group or a real team (Katzenbach and Smith 
1993:113). The distinction between working groups and teams revolves around performance results. 
The formers performance is a function of what members do as individuals, whereas the performance of 
the latter includes both individual results and what the authors call “collective work-products” 
(Katzenbach and Smith 1993:112). Such products can be a number of different things, the authors 
mention interviews, surveys and experiments, but the point is that a collective work-product is what 
two or more members of the team must work on together and which reflects a joint, real contribution 
from the team members (Katzenbach and Smith 1993:112). 
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Another distinction between teams and working groups revolves around accountability. In 
working groups the accountability focus is always on individual goals and accountabilities, and 
working group members do not take responsibility for work other than their own, nor do they try to 
develop incremental performance contributions which require the combined work of two or more 
members of the group (Katzenbach and Smith 1993:112). Teams however require both individual as 
well as mutual accountability, and rather than merely depend on sharing information and best practise 
performance standards, teams rely more on group discussion, debate and decision (Katzenbach and 
Smith 1993:112):  
Teams produce discrete work-products through the joint contributions of their members. 
This is what makes possible performance levels greater than the sum of all the 
individual bests of the team members. Simply stated, a team is more than the sum of its 
parts. (Katzenbach and Smith 1993:112) 
As an early step in developing a disciplined approach to team management, the authors offer a 
working definition or an essential discipline that real teams share: 
A team is a small number of people with complementary skills who are committed to a 
common purpose, set of performance goals, and approach for which they hold 
themselves mutually accountable. (Katzenbach and Smith 1993:112) 
The essence of a team is mutual commitment, without it the group performs as individuals, but this 
“commitment requires a purpose in which the team members can believe.” (Katzenbach and Smith 
1993:112). The best teams invest time and effort in “purposing” activity which continues throughout 
the life of the team, and which is about exploring, shaping and agreeing on a purpose which belongs to 
them both collectively and individually (Katzenbach and Smith 1993:113). Furthermore, the best 
teams also translate the greater purpose into specific performance goals and are successful in making 
purpose and goals build on one another; and by means of combining this with team commitment “they 
become a powerful engine of performance” (Katzenbach and Smith 1993:113).  
Open-ended discussion and active problem-solving meetings is also important in achieving 
high performance in teams, and the point here is that a clear perception of the goals enables the team 
members to focus discussion on how to pursue those goals (Katzenbach et al. 1993:113). So a brief 
summing up would be that real and high performing teams discuss, decide and do real work together 
(Katzenberg and Smith 1993).  
In addition, size matters and according to Katzenbach and Smith the effective teams they have 
met, read or heard about have all been between 2 and 25 people and the majority of them have 
numbered less than 10 (1993:114). In addition to being of a suitable size, a team must also develop the 
right mixture of skills which is necessary for the team to be able to its job (Katzenbach and Smith 
1993:114). Such skills fall into three categories, respectively technical or functional expertise, 
problem-solving and decision-making skills, and finally interpersonal skills (Katzenbach and Smith 
1993:115). In the first category, not only is it important that the team members have the prerequisite 
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professional skills to perform the expected tasks, it is also relevant that emphasis is placed on ensuring 
the presence of complementary professional skills in the team (Katzenbach and Smith 1993:115). The 
second category refers to the ability of the team to be able to identify the problems and opportunities 
they face, a skill which may be present at the onset of the team effort or will subsequently be 
developed on the job (Katzenbach and Smith 1993:115). The third one revolves around the importance 
of effective communication and constructive conflict, which depend on interpersonal skills and include 
“risk taking, helpful criticism, objectivity, active listening, giving the benefits of the doubt, and 
recognizing the interest and achievements of others” (Katzenbach and Smith 1993:115).  
The challenge lies in achieving the right balance between on the one hand personal compatibility and 
on the other hand the necessary mix of skills, but it is worth knowing that of all the teams Katzenberg 
et al. considered, “not one had all the needed skills at the outset.” (1993:115) and they discovered that 
teams “are powerful vehicles for developing the skills needed to meet the team’s performance 
challenge.” (1993:115). Therefore the authors point out that team selection should rely on skill 
potential as much as on skills which are already proven (Katzenberg et al. 1993:115).  
The above outlined discipline of teams is believed to be critical to the success of all teams 
(Katzenbach and Smith 993: 116). So in which cases is the team approach most suitable? Team 
performance may have the greatest impact on the “critical delivery point” of a company, i.e. where the 
cost and value of the company’s services or products are most directly determined (Katzenberg and 
Smith 1993:117): 
If performance at critical delivery points depends on combining multiple skills, 
perspectives and judgements in real time, then the team option is the smartest one. 
(Katzenberg and Smith 1993:117)  
Based on the above findings, it is time to consider how suitable it would be to strive for team 
performance in intelligence analysis, and how this could be assist in improving the quality of 
intelligence.   
3.5 The relevance of a team approach to intelligence analysis 
Previously in this work the role of analysis in intelligence failure has been outlined, and analysis 
increasingly depends on a combination of skills and perspectives. Based on the aforementioned it 
would seem reasonable to claim that intelligence analysis is a critical delivery point of an intelligence 
organization: The record shows that not only is analysis where failure in the delivery of the 
organization is most likely to occur, such failure precludes the ability of the intelligence to serve as a 
guide to the future and thus diminishes in value to its users. This way of viewing intelligence analysis 
as critical delivery point can also be said to apply not only the strategic level of intelligence, but also 
the tactical level. If tactical intelligence is flawed, it can potentially endanger the lives of military and 
other personnel and hamper mission success.  
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Even though analysts are individuals, there is no apparent reason why an intelligence prediction 
cannot be a collective work product. In addition, there seems to be no apparent reason why intelligence 
analysis could not be carried out in a setting which includes both individual as well as mutual 
accountability. Both of the previous two arguments support the idea that intelligence analysis can be 
carried out in a team. 
The “purposing” described by Katzenberg and Smith (1993:113) can also be applied in an 
intelligence analysis setting. In fact, this seems compatible with the idea of intelligence as having an 
advisory function (Herman 1996:56) but yet a role which is of critical importance to the ability of the 
government or the Armed Forces to be able to respond appropriately in a given situation. 
Also, there seems to be no apparent reason why intelligence analysis can not exploit the value 
in open-ended discussion and active problem-solving meetings. In order to be a real high-performing 
team, the analyst would have to discuss, decide and do real work together. This does not seem like an 
impossibility, even in the secrecy-ridden world of intelligence and intelligence analysis. The success of 
this measure depends on the ability to contain the discussion to a specifically identified team setting.  
Size matters in teams, and in order to be effective they should number somewhere between 2 
and 25 people, but probably best if less than 10. The view that intelligence analysis can not only take 
place, but is in fact best served, in small numbers is supported in the intelligence literature (Herman 
1996:237), and thus this is an indication that intelligence analysis can satisfy this critical success 
criteria for teams.  
It is fair to assume that intelligence analysts are primarily chosen on merit of expertise in a 
specific field of study. Miller (2008) would probably applaud such a view. Furthermore, the need to 
increase diversity among analysts will likely entail that the pool of analysts will become more 
heterogeneous, both in terms of personal background and area of expertise, which entails a 
combination of multiple skills. A team of analysts can thus be put together specifically to achieve the 
presence of complementary skills, even if not so diverse as envisioned by Katzenberg and Smith 
(1993). Also, even though a team of analysts have a critical task to carry out, there is no reason why 
not the team setting can be exploited to build and develop skills in individual analysts, and in this way 
the team can play a role in developing the skills needed to meet the team’s specific performance 
challenge.  
Most importantly however, a high-performing team requires the use of effective 
communication and constructive conflict, and this can be exploited to the benefit of analysis. It has 
previously been mentioned that a form of intellectual breakdown in linked to analysis failure, and 
consequently intelligence failure. The lack of conscious awareness of the workings of our own minds 
makes addressing our cognitive flaws quite challenging, to put it modestly. But sometimes these flaws 
may be more noticeable by others, even if not consciously. Maybe emphasis on the team as a frame for 
constructive conflict can assist in uncovering and addressing some of the distortive impact of such 
flaws.  If so, this would be a significant indicator that the deliberate use of teams in analysis could 
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assist in improving the quality of intelligence, and herein lays the major potential gain in using teams 
in analysis.  
 
3.6 Summary and tentative conclusion 
The following sums up the main points in this chapter:  
 
• The inherent weakness in intelligence analysis is closely linked to intellectual shortcomings 
which are hard to correct by oneself.  
• Several approaches and methods have been devised to counter the effect of those shortcomings, 
but so far no in-depth discussion on the use of teams in analysis has been carried out.  
• Business management has identified the use of teams as a way to enhance performance, and the 
approach is considered most suitable at critical delivery points of an organization.  
• Intelligence analysis can be seen as a critical delivery point for an intelligence organization, 
both at the strategic and tactical level, thus a team approach seems suitable.  
• A team can be distinguished from working groups in a number of ways, such as collective 
work products, mutual accountability, small numbers, complementary skills, a strong sense of 
purpose, reliance on discussion and debate, and achieving performance levels greater than the 
sum of the individual best.  
• There is reason to believe that the use of teams could be applied also in intelligence analysis, 
and team reliance on discussion and constructive conflict can be a useful way of partially 
countering the negative impact of individual intellectual shortcomings on analysis. 
 
Based on the above, the tentative conclusion is that by using knowledge about the use of teams in 
business management, intelligence analysis can improve its quality by enabling analysts to make more 
accurate predictions, i.e. predictions that are more accurate in describing the intensions of the 
opponents than what would have been the case without the use of teams. This leads into the next and 
fourth chapter wherein the empirical findings following analysis of the data collected in the interviews 
will be presented, before proceeding to the fifth and final chapter which following a discussion 
presents an overall conclusion.  
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4 Chapter 4 
The empirical findings and the team approach  
 
This chapter will present the findings resulting from the analysis of the data collected in the individual 
interviews. The data yielded insight into areas which went beyond issues related to the use of teams in 
intelligence analysis, and this chapter includes only the findings which were deemed relevant to the 
core perspective of this thesis and the discussion on teams in intelligence analysis. The findings will be 
presented grouped according respectively 1) new wars and augmented challenges in analysis, 2) how 
diversity can enhance analysis, 3) managing a diverse workforce, 4) characteristics of organizational 
culture, 5) intellectual shortcomings and analysis, and finally 6) the team approach. The final section 
of the chapter sums up the main points and presents a tentative conclusion.  
4.1 New wars and augmented challenges   
The findings confirmed the assumption that complex conflicts, or new wars, have had a profound 
impact on the demands for knowledge and competence in the intelligence organization and among 
intelligence analysts. This applies across a broad spectrum of issues and competence areas, to include 
but not limited to the need for strengthened cultural awareness, complementary perspectives in 
analysis and greater diversity among analysis staff. 
As emphasized by interviewee Z, the Norwegian experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 
1990’s were viewed as pivotal in leading to a shift in ‘shift in paradigm’ with regard to recognizing the 
need for diversity in intelligence analysis. The findings point to that this view of diversity was 
primarily perceived as having to do with different backgrounds in fields of academic study or 
knowledge. However, there was also support for the notion that diversity in personnel background 
such as for example gender, ethnicity and social background was relevant in an analysis resource 
perspective.  
Interviewee X spoke of how the Norwegian Armed Forces need to shift from being what was 
termed solution oriented to being problem oriented, in order to adequately be able to deal with the 
challenges in the new operational environment of new wars. This deserves a more detailed 
explanation: By solution oriented was meant that before one can point to an issue - popularly termed 
‘challenge’ - which should be addressed, in many circles within the Norwegian Armed Forces it is 
expected that one has to be ready to present a solution at the same time. If not, the issue will in many 
cases not receive further attention. Such an approach can help avoid jamming a leader or a commander 
with a plethora of ‘challenges’ which must be addressed. But it has a down-side too. In the view of the 
interviewee, in a complex system there is not always proximity between cause and effect, and so a 
           
 31 
 
 
            
          
 
 
recognition of and analysis of the problem is required, and this process one has to seek new knowledge 
and identify knowledge gaps both at the individual and organizational level. The failure to 
acknowledge the existence of problems, and the strong emphasis on solutions as described above, 
results in many knowledge voids being left uncovered.  
In the complex interdependencies in for example Afghan society, the need to uncover 
knowledge voids is a prerequisite for ensuring appropriate responses to any number of situations. Thus 
the context of new wars could entail that the greater organizational approach to handling problems 
need to be readdressed. The prior points not only to the need for being able to analyse the complex 
interdependencies in the societies in the new operational environments, but it also points to how such 
new environments challenges the entire intelligence cycle, to include appropriate tasking of the 
intelligence resources. 
The above also illustrates the wide range and profundity of the reflections on how conflicts 
such as for example in Afghanistan impact on the challenges encountered in intelligence analysis 
carried out in support of the mission. However, even though the interviewees recognized the 
complexity of new wars as demanding for intelligence analysis, this complexity was by some also 
viewed as a motivational factor in their work. As interviewee X expressed it ”The degree of 
complexity demands that we venture into the unknown, and that is what makes it interesting”.  
The findings support the previous assumption that new wars and complex conflicts, as for 
example in Afghanistan, have augmented the challenges in intelligence analysis by adding new 
complexities to the prediction efforts. Furthermore, diversity in knowledge and background among 
analysis staff is a resource in addressing those challenges and complexities. This underlines the need to 
have a conscious approach to managing diversity among analysis personnel, and more importantly the 
need to make every effort to address the inherent and the emergent challenges to the production of 
high-quality intelligence predictions.  
So now the attention will shift towards exploring how diversity can enhance analysis.  
4.2 How can diversity enhance analysis? 
Diversity can be understood as greater variety in for example educational, professional as well as 
personal background or in group identity. On a whole the interviewees expressed a positive view on 
diversity as a resource, but the data left a general impression that the appreciation of diversity in this 
analysis milieu primarily revolved around differences in fields of study of analysts, but to some extent 
this appreciation also extended to for example gender and ethnic background. The impression 
following analysis is that the focus on academic diversity to a great extent is the result of the 
experiences that this unit so far has been able to draw on, and is not a lack of appreciation of diversity 
in a wider sense.  
So how exactly can diversity improve analysis? It was viewed as a resource because it made it 
more likely that different perspectives would be applied in the course of the analysis process, and it 
was recognised that different professional backgrounds would likely have an impact on what people 
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focused on, and in this way diversity could help shed light on aspects which would otherwise not be 
taken into consideration in analysis. For example, as stated by interviewee M:   
It is not adequate for analysis to merely be aware of topics such as cultural and 
ethnographic intelligence. The decisive value of such awareness is to be able to 
determine what consequence such intelligence may have for the conduct of operations.  
In elongation of this interviewee M pointed out that cultural awareness is about more than 
understanding the local and regional etiquette, in the end it revolves around insight into ‘what makes 
people tick’ and understanding the rationality behind their actions. This illustrates the relevance of for 
example anthropology to intelligence analysis in the face of the new cultural settings where operations 
may take place, such as for example in Afghanistan or in Sudan.  
As such competence most likely will be gained in a civilian educational setting this also 
illustrates how increased diversity in fields of study among analysts could increase the number of 
analysts with a primarily civilian background. It cannot be assumed without reservation that mixing 
personnel with respectively primarily civilian or military background will be without consequences. 
Care has to be taken to ensure that minority members with reference to background do not feel left out 
or unappreciated in the greater group. The working environment has to be conducive to letting all 
perspectives and contribution come into play and be valued.   
Interviewee Z mentioned that diversity in analysis staff usually entailed that the predictions 
would be different, and when prompted with ’different in what way’, the answer was that “It would 
probably be closer to the ‘truth’, it will have more angles, usually be better substantiated.”  A similar 
view was offered by interviewee L, who stated that:  
If the team works, then diversity can be very positive as it can add resources which are 
decisive for being able to understand or uncover important aspects which might 
otherwise have gone undetected. It is not necessarily about the knowledge as such, but it 
is about being able to know what to look for. It is important to have the whole picture in 
order to be able to make predictions which are more precise, more ‘true’ in the sense of 
being closer to the way things really are. Then the Afghans do not appear irrational and 
it is possible to understand how the Taliban gains influence.  
The above quote also illustrates how the realization of the benefits of diversity depends on the 
framework which it is set to work within, and the role of the team in this respect will be addressed later 
on. The quote also underscores how diversity among analysts is a prerequisite for establishing 
situational awareness in today’s new wars, and how such diversity can contribute to increasing the 
quality of intelligence. 
Interviewee Y expressed concern that in spite of the emphasis on diversity among analysis 
staff, Y was concerned that although “They may have diversity in academic fields of study, they are 
still probably too homogenous.” In Y’s opinion this can be considered a weakness, as personal 
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background has an impact on what people focus on. This implies that greater heterogeneity among 
analysts can contribute to a wider perspective in analysis.     
The findings provide support for the view that diversity can improve the quality of intelligence 
analysis by enabling the production of predictions which are closer to the truth than they would 
otherwise be, and that this value of diversity is augmented in the context of new wars. However, 
increased diversity among personnel may have an impact on the approach to management and how the 
work is carried out, and this will be addressed in the subsequent section.  
 
4.3 Managing a diverse workforce 
A number of the possible follow-up questions in part one of the interview guide were designed to 
obtain information on whether the organizations view of diversity could be said to primarily belong in 
the learning-and-effectiveness paradigm the discrimination-and-fairness paradigm, or the access-and-
legitimacy paradigm (Thomas and Ely 1996:80). If the approach to diversity can be said to fall under 
the learning-and-effectiveness paradigm, it entails that an organization will be able to reap benefits 
which for example encompass “encompass learning, creativity, flexibility, organizational and 
individual growth” (Thomas and Ely 1996:80).  
When people from different identity-groups come together to work, the composition of the 
group will have an effect on the dynamics in the workplace: The experiences in corporate America 
have been that in spite of  numerous and varied initiatives to increase diversity, the positive impacts of 
diversity have not materialized, but rather the efforts to increase diversity in the workplace have in 
many cases “backfired, sometimes even heightened tensions among employees and hindering a 
company’s performance.” (Thomas and Ely 1996:79-80). The quote serves to illustrate that in order to 
reap benefits from increased diversity, it is not enough to assemble a number of people of different 
backgrounds and expertise and then expect organizational performance, or analytical performance in 
intelligence for that matter, to somehow magically improve.  
The findings are that the unit which the interviewees belong to has come far in adapting an 
approach which can be said to fall under the new paradigm of managing diversity. For example, high 
and uniform standards of performance, high tolerance for discussion and different views on issues, and 
the recognition that diversity can add value to the core activity of intelligence analysis, all pull in the 
direction of the learning-and-effectiveness paradigm.   
However, in other areas the unit is not within the sphere of the new paradigm. For example I 
found no indications of recognition that diversity can bring with it new ways of doing work. The 
resilience in this area may depend on the presence of specific methods already used in analysis, but 
nevertheless it signifies a lack of appreciation of the full value which diversity may bring to the 
organization. More importantly however, it indicates that if the unit pursues increased diversity in 
analysis staff, unless steps are taken to explore the perspectives a more diverse group of employees 
bring to the table, the unit may not be able to fully reap the benefits of the diversity and may even face 
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reduced performance. Even if such a reduction in performance is passing or marginal, given the critical 
importance of intelligence steps should be taken to avoid such an impact.  
At present the analysis personnel in the unit can only to a limited degree be considered to be 
diverse, but there seems to be an ambition to increase that level diversity. This underscores the need 
for preparedness to address management issues associated with greater diversity among analysis staff 
if an organization or unit aims to maximise the potential value which lies in increased diversity. 
Organizational culture is one aspect which is interesting when exploring the management of diversity 
and in the next section the link between the two will be one of the issues addressed. 
 
4.4 Characteristics of the organizational culture 
When the topic of the interviews turned to organizational culture, more specifically on the general 
style of professional interaction of the personnel in the unit, the interviewees shared their views on the 
organizational culture in the Norwegian Armed Forces in general, in their own parent intelligence unit 
as well as on the culture in some of its sub-units. All the interviewees in some way perceived the 
culture of their parent unit and its sub-units as different from the greater general organizational culture 
in the Norwegian Armed Forces.  
One might expect that this view of being different would primarily be associated with the 
nature of intelligence organizations which often tends to have some inherent traits based on ‘need-to-
know’ and secrecy. But although such aspects were included in the answers, the data revealed that 
emphasis was equally if not more on a culture which recognizes the value of diversity, places less 
emphasis on hierarchy, and where open discussions are recognized as a tool in getting the job done. 
For example interviewee X commented that: 
The Norwegian Armed Forces has a tradition for strangling diversity, as diversity is 
viewed as something which creates insecurity, friction and chaos, and they end up 
transforming diversity into homogeneity. In my unit we view diversity as resource the 
various individuals bring with them into the organization.  
In the description of the culture in the parent unit, several of the interviewees emphasized that the unit 
is viewed as being very professional, in the sense of being capable of performing to the expected high 
standards of excellence, it is flexible and adaptable and the personnel has a high level of competence. 
Another aspect which was highlighted by the majority of the interviewees was the high degree of 
personal motivation for the work in the unit, and as described by interviewee Z “People are interested 
in their job to a degree which is beyond what is normal.”  
In the analysis milieu of the unit the presence of a culture which emphasises “high ceilings” 
with regard to tolerance for debate and critique was not merely present but was also seen as a pivotal 
resource. The data indicates that the work demands a great degree of personal involvement as 
discussions run deep and it is demanded of the individual analyst not only that they present their own 
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judgements on issues but also have the courage to critique the judgements and views of their 
colleagues.  
Another aspect which was emphasised by several interviewees was how the traditional military 
emphasis on hierarchy was downplayed in the unit, and how this served to enhance the likelihood that 
all contributions and points of view could come into play, regardless of the rank of the contributor. 
This again allowed for a relaxed atmosphere, and as expressed by interviewee Z “We have fun at 
work!” 
The finding following examination of the data is that in this intelligence parent unit as well as 
in its analysis sub-unit the culture perceives itself as being different from the general hierarchical 
culture in the Norwegian Armed Forces. This ‘differentness’ includes a greater appreciation of and 
reflections on the value of knowledge as a pivotal resource, and the view that discussion, questioning 
and receiving critique on judgements and analysis is not only positive in the intelligence analysis 
milieu at hand, but is in fact seen as a tool which is necessary to ensure a high level of performance. 
The identified characteristics also facilitates the management of a diverse workforce, as the tolerance 
for discussion and critique can also be of value in the process of absorbing new approaches to work 
and in dealing with the potential heightened tension which can follow in the wake of increased 
diversity in personnel.  
However, now the attention turns in a different direction towards forms of intellectual 
shortcomings in analysis.   
 
4.5 Intellectual shortcomings and analysis   
When queried about whether it is fair to claim that intelligence analysis also can be said to contain 
decision-making aspects in evaluation and judgement, the interviewees were all careful to initially 
emphasise that the role of intelligence is merely advisory and is only one of several elements in a 
commanders planning- and decision making process. Even so, the collected data clearly indicates 
support for aforementioned view of analysis as containing some characteristics of decision-making, 
within the judgement portion of intelligence analysis. The purpose of the question was to establish if 
the data could provide some support for the view that the approach of Finkelstein, Whitehead and 
Campbell (2008) might be relevant in an intelligence context. Briefly, that approach is the use of a 
system of expressively communicated safeguards to assist in avoiding the unconscious cognitive 
processes from having a distortive impact on judgements and decisions.  
The attempts in the data collection to uncover the views of the interviewees on the possible 
value of the use of a specific and explicitly stated system of safeguards against the impact of cognitive 
biases only yielded a limited amount of data. This could be due to a number of factors, but likely 
causes are firstly that the question and the lead-in to it was not clear enough to facilitate substantial 
answers, secondly the question came late in the interview and thus maybe at a time when the 
interviewees and the interviewer were experiencing what can be termed a touch of interviewing 
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fatigue, and based on the earlier answers during each of the interviews it did not seem equally relevant 
to ask this question in every interview.   
The two answers which were provided to this question were modest in their support for the idea 
of a system of explicit safeguards, but clear in their indication that although the potential value of such 
a safeguard system would depend entirely on the way it was designed, it could not be ruled out that it 
could be of value as a tool to attempt to minimize the impact of various cognitive traps. However, the 
collected data in this case did not provide adequate grounds for any more specific interpretation or 
conclusion in this area.  
The data which resulted from questions relating to the role that emotions might play in 
affecting the analysis process indicated a solid level of awareness among the interviewees that 
emotions, or biases as the interviewees preferred to call them, can distort analysis. However, the data 
further indicated that the interviewees were confident that the effect of such emotional bias to a large 
extent was offset by some of the methods used in analysis, such as for example ACH which several 
interviewees claimed contributes to objectivity.  
The interviewees were to some extent all familiar with the potential affects of unconscious 
though processes, or cognitive traps as they described it, on judgements and analysis. The data 
indicates that the topic had been modestly addressed in previous training of the interviewees, but few if 
any specific references to this phenomenon are made once that training has been completed. 
Nevertheless, among them the interviewees mentioned several examples of how attempts are made to 
counter the potential distorting impact of cognitive traps. For example, there is recognition that 
individual analysts may become trapped by cognitive bias, and therefore any individual product must 
be read by and subjected to evaluation by more than one analyst, as well as the head of section. 
‘Sparring’ between analysts was also highlighted as being a useful way to obtain relevant corrections 
on individual products.  
The data is clear in indicating that the use of specific terminology or explicit claims that one 
might suspect that a colleague has fallen prey to bias was not normally used. The closest thing would 
be as described by interviewee M when a comment such as “now you are thinking conventionally” 
might be used to point out possible flaws in a colleague’s judgement or analysis. Nor does the data 
indicate that there are any control mechanisms to attempt to specifically uncover group-think, 
something which can be a challenge in a small team of analysts.  
In the response to the various questions which in some way dealt with judgements, the impact 
of biases and how to counter them, one thing was mentioned again and again; the value of open 
discussion among the analysts. This indirect approach was also highlighted as being a valuable method 
to attempt to avoid method was also seen as being a countering force in efforts to avoid group-think 
from gaining hold in a small team of analysts.  
The findings are that the intelligence personnel is aware of the potential distorting impact that 
unconscious mental processing may have on their judgements in analysis, but that there is at present no 
explicitly expressed system or method to specifically safeguard against such impacts. Rather the 
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personnel have considerable confidence in that the methods used in analysis, such as for example 
ACH, are of value in ensuring objectivity and evading the impact of biases. In the opinion of the 
interviewees, the culture which allows and emphasises a tolerance for discussion among analysts is of 
pivotal importance in reducing the impact of biases on the prediction as well as reducing the likelihood 
of group-think. As will be shown, these aspects are put to use in the team approach to analysis, which 
is the topic of the ensuing section.  
 
4.6 The team approach  
Several of the interviewees made references to teams, and the topic was in some way touched upon in 
all of the interviews, and the findings revealed that the unit uses a team approach to all-source analysis 
at the tactical level. For example interviewee Z stated that the main purposes in selecting a team 
approach were to ensure that the members of the team become familiar with one another’s strengths 
and weaknesses, make them confident with each other, increase the ‘ceiling height’ and make them 
accept responsibility for more than just themselves: “It is the team which delivers the product!” The 
team as such is responsible for and stands behind the product, and this serves to create mutual 
accountability and a sense of common purpose.  
The teams are small, usually less than five, one of which is the team leader. Even so it was 
emphasized that the structure of the teams is flat and is characterized by the un-hierarchic approach to 
work and thus ensuring that rank is not a determining factor in whether or not a view is presented in 
the team.  
The goal is also to put together teams which are not homogenous in their areas of expertise. 
This is intended to serve as a resource in approaching the analytical challenges from several angles, 
but it is also viewed as a resource in avoiding group think. When queried on how small teams may lead 
to group think, the reply was that there are strong personalities involved which are confident in their 
own professional competence, and that diversity is viewed an asset in reducing the likelihood of 
cognitive convergence, also known as group-think.   
For example, interviewee N claimed that the high levels of expertise and insight among all-
source analysts and other relevant experts was an enabling factor for creativity and new ways of 
thinking, and that in combination with an open approach this lead to new inputs and thus had a positive 
impact on all-source analysis. This brings the attention to what seems to be the pivotal resource in the 
team approach - that of encouraging as well as demanding that the team members engage in 
discussions wherein they critique each others job-related views, judgements and analysis. The 
discussion is intended to serve as a way of avoiding a distortive impact of unconscious mental 
processes, or biases, on the final product. It must be pointed out however that this approach does not 
come in lieu of other methods, such as for example ACH, but is a supplement to them and is meant to 
improve the quality of predictions.  
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The realization of the benefit of this approach requires that the team members are able to differentiate 
between critique directed towards the work of a person and the person him- or herself. This applies 
both to the ones presenting the critique as well as the ones whose work is being subjected to the 
critique. As said by interviewee L:  
Those who have worked together over some time are more likely to function well 
together. In teams where this is not the case there is greater likelihood that criticism is 
taken personally, that individuals do not challenge each other, and that although a 
thought or a comment on the issue at hand is present in the mind of one the team 
members – it is not communicated.  
Later on L added that “When criticism is taken personally, it can make the team fall apart”.  The 
ability of the team to handle discussions in a constructive manner must be ensured if the team 
approach is to bring with it the intended improvement in the quality of analysis. In order to ensure the 
presence of such ability, emphasis is placed on integrating the teams prior to deployment to the area of 
operations. Even if challenging and discussions work well while at home in familiar surroundings, this 
does not necessarily mean that it will be the case when deployed to more taxing and demanding 
working environment. For example, as expressed by interviewee L:    
Here at home, in peacetime, it is unproblematic to challenge one another, but not quite 
so when deployed abroad in a more demanding environment.  
Awareness of this nuance is why the integration of the team prior to deployment is so important. The 
goal is to establish small teams of analysts which are moulded into a team prior to deployment to the 
area of operations in order to be able to exploit the benefits of the team approach while on site. The 
intelligence organization has several groups of analysts which the members of the respective teams are 
drawn from. The ‘life span’ of a team is the duration of the deployment period which is usually about 
six months, equivalent to the length of the deployment period for most Norwegian military personnel 
in operations abroad. Upon completion of each tour the analysis teams are dissolved shortly after 
having returned home.  
Interviewee Y also stated that when the analysis teams are deployed to operations abroad, they 
are well integrated, they feel confident in each others capabilities, and this serves to enhance the 
quality of the products. Interviewee N also stressed how the analysis processes are enhanced when the 
team which are deployed abroad are well integrated prior to deployment, and how important it is that 
the persons who will make up the team get to know each other well.  
It was also mentioned that the team approach is not unique to intelligence analysis, but is 
important in many settings, for example in mobile observation teams, and according to interviewee X 
“somehow it seems easier to integrate teams once abroad.”  However, and as stressed by several of the 
interviewees, what sets the all-source analysis team approach in this unit apart is the degree of 
emphasis which is placed on team integration prior to deployment, and how this integration is of 
pivotal value in addressing a previously identified primary pitfall: the lack of feeling secure enough to 
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engage in debate and critique. As an example of why this important, interviewee X exemplified by 
saying   
If I am going to work with you, then I have to know your limitations with regard to 
what you are likely to say to me and how. The establishment of an understanding of 
each others’ way of reasoning is decisive for the ability of the analysis team to deliver.  
The above quote illustrates the profundity of the purpose of the integration of the analysis team, and 
how this is viewed as having a direct impact on the ability of the team as such to deliver high-quality 
intelligence products. So the team approach is not chosen merely to improve the work atmosphere 
environment while deployed abroad, or simply to put an interesting label on the analysis resource. The 
team approach is specifically adopted with the purpose of improving the quality of all-source analysis 
at the tactical level while deployed to a challenging operational environment abroad.  
The findings also support a conclusion that the team approach in this case so far has 
emphasized establishing processes which favour free exchange of ideas, judgments and critique as a 
way to enhance the usefulness of the existing expertise. Less emphasis seems to have been placed on 
specifically using the team approach as a way to building cohesion and realizing the value to analysis 
of greater diversity among analysts, and this point in the direction that the unit has not yet fully 
realized the potential of a team approach in analysis.       
 
4.7 Summary and tentative conclusion  
In summing up, the main points of the findings are that:   
 
• Intelligence analysis is faced with augmented challenges as a result of new wars, and diversity 
in knowledge and background of analysts is a valuable resource in addressing those challenges.  
• Diversity among analysts can improve the quality of intelligence by providing a wider scope of 
expertise and by drawing on more diverse personal backgrounds among analysts, thus enabling 
the production of predictions which more accurately describe the intentions of the opponent. 
• There is an ambition to increase diversity among analysts, underscoring the need for 
preparedness to address management issues associated with greater diversity, although aspects 
of the organizational culture seem well suited to integrate diversity.    
• The intelligence personnel is aware of the potential distorting impact that intellectual 
shortcomings, or ‘cognitive traps’, may have on their judgements in analysis, and they rely on 
methods such as for example ACH in striving for objectivity in analysis, but a culture which 
emphasises a tolerance for discussion among analysts was also perceived as important in 
reducing the impact of biases on predictions as well as reducing the likelihood of group-think. 
• The unit uses a team approach to all-source analysis at the tactical level while deployed to a 
challenging operational environment abroad. What sets this particular team approach apart is 
the depth of integration which emphasises building awareness among analysts on each others 
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ways of reasoning and building a sense of security which ensures the engagement of all team 
members in debate and critique.  
• The teams are small and when composing them emphasis is placed on complementary areas of 
expertise among analysts, and emphasis is placed on integrating the teams prior to deployment 
abroad.   
• The product of the team belongs to the team, not to a group of individual analysts.  
• When the teams are well functioning, they are believed to improve the quality of analysis by 
enabling the production of collective work products, i.e. predictions on the intentions of ones 
adversaries which are more precise than they would have been without the use of teams.  
• Although using an explicitly stated approach to the use of teams, the unit does not seem to yet 
have realized the full potential value of the team approach with regard to the potential gains in 
analysis capability which can come as a result of greater diversity among analysts.  
  
Based on the above main points, the tentative conclusion in this chapter is that what the interviewees 
claim is the use of teams has improved the quality of intelligence analysis. I use ‘claim’, because prior 
to making a more definite conclusion on this it has to be determined if these teams can be said to 
qualify as being real teams, or if they are merely a variation of a working group approach. However, a 
discussion on this issue belongs in the next and final chapter.  
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5 Chapter 5 
The use of teams in intelligence analysis 
The purpose of this chapter is to pull together the main points and tentative conclusions from the 
preceding chapters before presenting an overall conclusion. The first section scrutinises the claim of a 
team approach which was uncovered in the empirical findings in the previous chapter. Then the 
attention shifts in section 5.2 to focus the discussion on how the use of teams can improve the quality 
of intelligence. The next section contains a discussion on how teams can be a resource in managing a 
diverse workforce, followed by the final section which concludes the work by presenting some final 
remarks and answering the research question.     
5.1 Are they really teams?  
The first step is to examine if the use of teams as the described in chapter three is really about teams, 
and not merely a variation of groups. As far as performance results are concerned, the findings show 
that in this case the teams produce what can be termed “collective work-products” (Katzenbach and 
Smith 1993:112) in the way of predictions which one or more members of the team must work 
together on and which reflects a joint and real contribution of the team members. 
Also in the areas of accountability the findings support the idea that the teams are ‘real teams’, 
as they produce discrete work-products through the joint contributions of their members. In this case 
the discrete work products are the predictions, and the production of them rests on the concept of 
mutual accountability of the team members. As stated by one interviewee Z “It is the team which 
delivers the product!”, and the finding in the empirical material that ‘It is the team which is responsible 
for and stands behind the product, and this serves to create mutual accountability and a sense of 
common purpose.’ This latter comment also supports the idea that these teams engage in purposing 
activity, and it is fair to assume that this is present throughout the six month lifespan of the teams.  
The findings did not uncover any reference to specific performance goals, but the use of teams 
was viewed as pivotal in order to be able to deliver high-quality predictions, and the view on the teams 
revealed in the interviews certainly seemed to fit what Katzenberg and Smith would call “a powerful 
engine of performance” (1993:113). 
The teams in the findings also emphasise the use of discussions, and though I am uncertain if it 
can be termed active problem solving meetings, the findings support the claim that the teams have a 
clear perception of the goals as well as a strong focus on how to pursue those goals. So these teams, to 
paraphrase Katzenberg and Smith (1993) really discuss, decide and do real work together, and thus 
they can be considered to be high performing teams.  
            
42  
 
 
           
           
 
 
Also with regard to size do the teams described in the empirical findings qualify as real teams, 
as they usually consist of less than five analysts and the findings of Katzenbach and Smith are that the 
majority of effective teams have less than 10 members (1993:114).  
The final aspect which will be considered in this qualification process is the issue of the 
mixture of skills in the teams. The skills fall into three categories, respectively technical or functional 
expertise, problem-solving and decision-making skills, and finally interpersonal skills. In a real team, 
in the area of functional expertise, the emphasis should be on prerequisite professional skills as well as 
complementary professional skills. In these teams, the functional expertise by way of the prerequisite 
background in knowledge in order to be able to carry out analysis is present, and with regard to 
complementary professional skills, it seems to be present to a limited degree but with the intention of 
augmenting the complementarities of skills by pursuing greater diversity in the background of the 
analysts.  
In the second category, which refers to the ability of the team to be able to identify the 
problems as well as the opportunities it faces, this must be said to be present, as this is closely 
connected to the very reason why these teams are put together: to be able to function in the challenging 
and taxing environment while deployed abroad in a conflict area, and in order to serve as a 
counterweight to the distortive impacts of biases on analysis.  
The third category revolves around the importance of effective communication and constructive 
conflict, which again depend on interpersonal skills. The teams in question places significant emphasis 
on the use of discussion and creating an atmosphere characterized by ‘high ceilings’ with regard to 
tolerance for debate and challenging the judgments of others in analysis.  
All together, in the area of mixture of skills in the teams, there are adequate grounds for 
claiming that these teams qualify as ‘real teams’. The challenge for these teams, as for any team, is in 
achieving the right balance between personal compatibility and the necessary mixture of skills. 
Katzenberg and Smith pointed out that of all the teams they considered, none had all the needed 
skills at the onset, and that teams are powerful engines for developing the skills needed to meet the 
performance challenge (1993:115). However, given the decisive importance of the intelligence 
predictions to a commander on the ground, these analysis teams should have the skills needed prior to 
being deployed. The emphasis on integrating the teams prior to deployment will enhance the 
likelihood that the team will possess the prerequisite skills as they set out to carry out the task of 
analysis. In this area, the skills include the acquired appreciation of how the various members of the 
team reasons, what the limits are for to what degree and how they will challenge each others 
judgements, and establishing the necessary level of trust and familiarity which is needed to ensure that 
all views and thoughts on an issue is shared within the team, regardless of rank or area of expertise. 
The conclusion here is that the use of teams in all-source analysis at the tactical level in the 
empirical findings can be said to qualify as true and high performing teams. As teams have been put to 
use in intelligence analysis it provides grounds for re-examining how their use has a positive impact on 
the performance of analysts, and thus serve to enhance the quality of their predictions.  
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5.2 How does the use of teams improve the quality of intelligence? 
As described earlier, it is accepted within the intelligence community that intelligence analysis can fall 
prey to impairment in judgement resulting from biases, forms of intellectual shortcomings. The authors 
of Think Again suggested that in order to reduce the likelihood of unconscious biases having a negative 
impact on judgement, a systematic approach of safeguards could be used (Finkelstein, Whitehead & 
Campbell 2008).    
However, as biases are often too deep rooted in emotions and unconscious processes to be 
objectively analyzed, relying on self-analysis seems like an insufficient solution (Finkelstein, 
Whitehead and Campbell 2008:175). This points in the direction that a team setting would be well 
suited to utilize a system of safeguards, to include in an intelligence analysis team. As mentioned 
before, intelligence analysis depends heavily on methods which they believe go far too severely reduce 
the likelihood of biases having a negative impact on judgement, such as for example ACH ( Heuer 
1999). However, any contribution which may serve to counter the negative impacts of cognitive biases 
on intelligence analysis should be welcomed, and the use of teams is one such possible contribution.  
What if the there is an unnoticed emotional impact on one or several specific judgements in the 
ACH process? What if a different view on what it would be rational to believe would change the 
direction and the result of the analysis process? Maybe a system of safeguards can reduce the risk of 
errors in judgement in many areas of intelligence analysis? Well, these questions must go unanswered 
for the time being, and at present the findings in the material seem to indicate that there is no specific 
safeguard system, similar to the one described by Finkelstein, Whitehead and Campbell (2008) in use 
which is designed to counter the negative impacts of biases in judgement and analysis.  
The potential value of such a system “would depend entirely on what one found”9 in the sense 
that it would depend on if one were able to find or develop a system of safeguards which is would be 
relevant and easy to use in an analysis setting. Does this mean that the focus on teams has little 
relevance in countering the possible negative impact of biases? Not at all.  
In the efforts to integrate an analysis team, the process also aims to familiarize the members of 
the team with each others strengths and weaknesses. As described above the promises that underpin an 
effective team is commitment and trust. In addition, the team integration in this case includes emphasis 
on that the team members actively should seek to challenge each others judgements. The cumulative 
effect of these three aspects may be that the team members point out or challenge each others biases, 
even if this is not done systematically or wittingly. Viewed in this way, which is supported by the 
empirical findings, the cumulative effect of the aforementioned aspects of team integration is that it 
can serve to reduce the likelihood of biases having a negative impact on judgement, analysis and 
predictions.  
                                                
9 According to interviewee Z   
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Little attention seems to have been devoted to the potential value of true teams in optimizing 
the use of personnel resources in intelligence analysis. As the reflections on the value and role of true 
high performing teams grew out of a business management context, the above findings provides 
positive support to the initial research question of this thesis.  
The conclusion based on the findings in intelligence and business management literature and 
the findings from the empirical material in this work is that intelligence analysis is a critical delivery 
point of an intelligence organization suitable for the use of teams, and the use of teams in intelligence 
analysis can improve the performance of analysts by exploiting the use of team processes which can 
serve to reduce the negative impact of biases on judgements, and thus serve to enhance the quality of 
their predictions. Decisive in this is that the use of teams in analysis, supported by the theoretical as 
well as the empirical findings, enables a level of performance which is greater than the sum of the 
performances of the individual analysts. 
 
5.3 Teams as a resource in managing diversity in the workforce 
As previously mentioned, the full potential value of diversity in an organization will probably not be 
realized until the view on diversity in an organization can be said to fall within the learning-and-
effectiveness paradigm of Thomas and Ely (1996). According to the findings, the intelligence unit in 
question can in some areas be said to be within this paradigm, but not completely. This is because the 
current view on and practice of exploiting diversity in the unit seem to be somewhat too closely linked 
to diversity in academic or educational background, and not too a great enough extent linked to 
diversity in other areas such as for example gender, ethnicity or group identity.  
At the same time there are indications that increased diversity may in some cases prove to be 
counterproductive if for example different identity groups are not allowed to draw on the full spectrum 
of the resources they bring to the organization. Even though the intelligence analysis in this case takes 
place in a much smaller organization and on a smaller scale than the corporate level referred to in 
Thomas and Ely (1996), there is no reason why the challenges they point out should not to some extent 
apply to an intelligence organization and its analysts. This points in the direction that as the unit moves 
towards achieving greater diversity among analysts, the very same diversity may potentially also have 
a negative impact on the collective performance of analysts. At the same time, the value of diversity 
among analysts is perceived as being a significant resource in efforts to improve the quality of 
analysis.   
So in light of this, can a team perspective on analysis be of value in addressing the potential 
resources as well as pitfalls of increased diversity? My claim is that yes, it can. Even though the unit in 
question may at present not have substantial experience in dealing with a broader aspect of diversity in 
its teams, in my view their current approach to the use of teams may also be of value in dealing with 
some of the potential additional challenges resulting from future increased diversity among analysts.  
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As long as the unit is successful in the efforts to build solid familiarity and awareness of each others 
weaknesses among team members, along with establishing a team culture for challenging each others’ 
judgements, combined with the presence of commitment and trust, the cumulative effect of this may 
also serve as an enabler in dealing with some of the potential negative impact which may be the result 
from greater diversity among analysts.  
This entails that the use of teams can serve as a tool in integrating a more diverse group of 
analysts, and so the use of teams is an important management tool in realizing the intended gains in 
analysis from a more diversified group of analysts. As such diversity is viewed as being of pivotal 
importance in improving analysis capability, this again underscores how a team approach to 
intelligence analysis can be said to improve the quality of intelligence.  
 
5.4 Final remarks and conclusion  
The work in this thesis is aimed at answering the question if there is something to learn from the use of 
teams in business management which can be used to improve the quality of intelligence analysis. 
Increased quality here refers to the ability of analysts to produce predictions which are more accurate 
in describing the intentions of opponents than they would be without the use of teams.  
The conclusion based on the findings in intelligence and business management literature and 
the findings from the empirical material in this work is that:  
 
• Business management has identified the use of teams as a method to enhance performance at 
critical delivery point of an organization.  
• Distinguishing characteristics of true teams include mutual accountability, high tolerance for 
discussion and critique, collective work products, and a strong sense of purpose.  
• Intelligence analysis is a critical delivery point in intelligence and thus suitable for the use of 
teams.  
• The use of teams in intelligence analysis enables a level of performance in analysis which is 
greater than the sum of the performances of the individual analysts.  
• This enhanced level of performance increases the analytical capability to make predictions 
which more accurately describe the intentions of the opponents, thus increasing the quality of 
intelligence analysis.  
• The use of teams in analysis can also enable the realization of expected gains in analysis 
capability that more diversity among analysts is expected to bring. As such diversity is of 
pivotal importance in improving the quality of intelligence analysis this further underscores the 
relevance of the use of teams in intelligence analysis.  
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Based on the above, the answer to the research question   
Is there something to learn from the use of teams in business management 
which can be used to improve the quality of intelligence analysis?  
Is that yes, there is something which can be learned from the use of teams in business management 
which can be used to improve the quality of intelligence analysis. This is primarily valid for all-source 
intelligence analysis at the tactical level, but it would be presumptuous to without reservation conclude 
that the same is valid for all-source analysis at the strategic level. Therefore further study on the use of 
teams in intelligence analysis in a wider context should be carried out before a claim of wider 
generalization can be made.    
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Verbal sources 
The primary source data in this study was collected by interviewing six members of the same tactical 
level intelligence unit in the Norwegian Armed Forces in May 2009. A prerequisite for the 
participation of the interviewees was that they were assured complete anonymity. During the interview 
process the six interviewees were therefore non-sequentially provided the respective code names of L, 
M, N, X, Y and Z, and these code names have been used to distinguish between the interviewees when 
quotes are used.    
The collected material, mind maps and notes, will be made available to the commission upon 
request. Appropriate contact information can also be made available to the commission should they 
seek to verify that these interviews were carried out as described.    
 
           
 49 
 
 
            
          
 
 
Annex 1 
Intervjuguide  
Del 1 – Nye kriger og mangfold  
Hovedspørsmål  
A 1: Slik du ser det, har vår tids nye rammer for militære operasjoner, som for eksempel i Afghanistan, 
endret kravene til kunnskaps- og kompetansebehovet for etterretningsanalytikere? (Alternativt:  ..for 
etterretningspersonell?)  
 
B 1: Først innledningsvis si noe om begrepet mangfold, og deretter spørsmålet: I lys av de 
utfordringene du møter i ditt arbeid, kan du si noe om hvordan et større mangfold kan tenkes å påvirke 
kvaliteten på prediksjonene?  
 
C 1: Dersom du tenker hovedsakelig på din egen gruppe kolleger, hvordan vil du beskrive 
organisasjonskultur? Slik du oppfatter det, skiller den seg fra organisasjonskulturen for øvrig i 
Forsvaret?  
 
Mulige oppfølgingsspørsmål, avhengig av svarene på A1, B1 og C1 over  
(1) Er ditt inntrykk at behovet for større mangfold er anerkjent på samtlige nivåer i organisasjonen? 
Eller er det en anerkjennelse som hovedsaklig er blant dere som i det daglige jobber med 
etterretningsfaget? 
Kjenner du til om det har vært foreslått eller vurdert at behovet for større mangfold blant analytikere 
også kan føre til endringer i måten arbeidet utføres på?  
 
(2) Slik du ser det, hva er synet i din enhet på anerkjennelse av nye muligheter for læring som et 
resultat av større mangfold? Hva med eventuelle nye utfordringer som kan være en konsekvens av nye 
perspektiver som følge av økt mangfold?  
 
(3) Er organisasjonskulturen slik at der er rimelig å hevde at det stilles høye krav til samtliges innsats? 
Tillates enkelte grupper eller personer å levere eller prestere på et lavere nivå i perioder?  
 
(4) Er det ditt inntrykk at din arbeidsgiver legger til rette for eller stimulerer til personlig og faglig 
utvikling?  
 
(5) Det neste jeg kommer inn på gjelder åpenhet, jeg tenker da på toleranse for debatt og konstruktive 
meningsforskjeller. Hvis du tenker primært på din egen gruppe av kolleger, hvordan vil du beskrive 
synet på debatt og meningsforskjeller i arbeidet? 
 
(6) Å være verdsatt kan handle om ulike former for anerkjennelse av jobben man gjør, også i form av 
økonomisk kompensasjon i form av lønn. Slik du ser det, hvor viktig er det at alle ansatte opplever at 
de er verdsatt av arbeidsgiver? Er det din oppfatning at ansatte i enheten virkelig føler seg verdsatt?  
 
(7) Hvordan vil du si at din enhets oppgave er definert og forstått, både av dere selv, og i en større 
sammenheng for øvrig i organisasjonen? 
 
(8) I din enhet, hvordan vil du beskrive strukturen? Flat og ubyråkratisk eller byråkratisk og 
hierarkisk? Hvordan påvirker dette eventuelt utveksling av synspunkter og ideer? 
            
50  
 
 
           
           
 
 
Intervjuguide  
Del 2 – Tankeprosesser og vurderinger  
 
Spørsmål  
A Vil du kunne være enig i at det kan være riktig å si at analyse på et vis innebærer både vurderinger 
og beslutninger? Vil du eventuelt beskrive det på en annen måte?  
 
B Kan du si noe om i hvilken grad dere utfordrer hverandres vurderinger? Tas slike spørsmål opp i en 
form for gruppedebatt, eller dreier det seg mer om en form for byråkratisk prosess i ”linjen”?   
 
C Slik du ser det, har følelser noen plass i vurderingen dere gjør i arbeidet? (Direkte/indirekte?) Vil du 
si at målet er at vurderinger skal foretas på et utelukkende rasjonelt grunnlag?  
 
D Kjenner du til noen ubevisste tankeprosesser som kan påvirke ditt arbeid? 
  
E Har du noen ideer om hvordan du eventuelt kan unngå at ubevisste tankeprosesser negativt påvirker 
ditt arbeid og dine vurderinger?   
 
F I hvilken grad er det et tema blant deg og dine kolleger at ubevisste tankeprosesser kan påvirke deres 
vurderinger i arbeidet?  
 
G Slik du ser det, tror du at spesifikke, systematiske og uttalte vurderinger knyttet til ubevisste 
tankeprosesser og deres påvirkning på arbeidet vil kunne tilføre merverdi, eller vil det bare være enda 
mer å forholde seg til i en hektisk arbeidssituasjon?  
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Annex 2 
Interview guide  
Part 1 – New wars and diversity   
Main questions  
A 1: From your perspective, has the new setting for military operations in e.g. Afghanistan altered the 
knowledge and competence requirement for intelligence analysts? (Alternatively:  ..for intelligence 
personnel?)  
  
B 1: Initially address the term diversity, followed by a question: In light of the challenges you 
encounter in your work, could you say something about how greater diversity in the workforce could 
be envisioned to affect the quality of intelligence predictions?  
  
C 1: If you think primarily of you own group of colleagues, how would you describe the 
organizational culture? The way you see it, does it differ from the general organizational culture in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces?  
  
Possible follow-up questions, depending on the answers to A1, B1 and C1 above  
(1) Do you have the impression that the need for greater diversity is recognized on all levels of the 
organization? Or is this mainly a prevailing recognition among those of you who work with 
intelligence on a daily basis?  
Are you aware of any proposals or assessments stating that the need for greater diversity among 
analysts could also lead to changes in the way the work is carried out? 
  
(2) In your opinion, how does your unit recognize new possibilities for learning as arising from greater 
diversity? What about potential new challenges that might arise as a consequence of new perspectives 
resulting from increased diversity?   
  
(3) Is the organizational culture such that it is reasonable to maintain that high expectations are placed 
on the efforts of all members? Are some groups or individuals allowed to periodically perform at lower 
levels?  
 
(4) Is it your impression that your employer facilitates or encourages personal and professional 
development? 
  
(5) My next question addresses frankness, i.e. level of tolerance for accepting debate and constructive 
differences of opinion. Thinking primarily of your own group of colleagues, how would you describe 
their view on debate and differences of opinion in their work?   
  
(6) Being appreciated may be about various forms of job recognition, including remuneration. In your 
view, how important is it that employees, including analysts, experience that they are appreciated by 
their employer? In you view, do the employees in your unit feel appreciated?  
  
(7) How would you say that your unit’s tasks are defined and understood, both within the unit itself 
and in the organization at large?  
 
(8)How would you describe the structure of your unit? Flat and non-bureaucratic or bureaucratic and 
hierarchical? How does this potentially affect the exchange of views and ideas?  
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Interview guide  
Part 2 – Thought processes and judgements   
  
Questions  
A Is it possible for you to agree that it may be correct to state that analysis somehow entails both 
evaluations and decisions?  Would you perhaps describe it another way?  
 
B Can you describe to what degree you challenge each others evaluations or judgements? Are such 
questions subject to group debates, or are they addressed in a more bureaucratic process in the chain of 
command? 
  
C In your view, are emotions allowed to be part of your professional evaluations? 
(Directly/Indirectly?) Would you state that the goal is that the evaluations or judgements should be 
based on a purely rational approach?    
  
D Are you aware of any unconscious thought processes which may have an impact on your work?  
  
E Do you have any thoughts on how you may avoid subconscious thought processes having a negative 
impact on your work and your judgement?  
 
F To what degree do you and you colleagues discuss whether subconscious processes might impact on 
judgements in your work?  
 
G The way you see it, do you think that specific, systematic and explicitly stated evaluations of 
subconscious processes and how these may affect your work could enhance your ability to perform, or 
would it merely be even more to deal with in a hectic work situation?  
 
